Interview with Robert R. Bowie for the Jean Monnet Foundation, Lausanne.
June 15, 1981 in Washington, DC.

Leonard Tennyson: Bob, in reading over Monnet's memoirs, I note he mentions meeting you with McCloy, soon after the war, in Germany. Can you tell me something about the circumstances under which you met him?

Robert Bowie: My first recollection of meeting him -- talking to him and dealing with him -- was actually in Paris. He, I think, did come to Germany... McCloy was an old friend and I think I may have first met him there. But I don't really have any lively recollection of what took place. It's very hard at this distance to reconstruct exactly what that occasion was. I do remember that McCloy spoke a lot of Monnet, once the Schuman Plan was on the table. He had a close association with him in New York in the '30's and had a very warm regard for him. I remember very well McCloy's talking about Monnet. But as I've said, my first real recollection of Monnet in any detail was when I went down to Paris on behalf of McCloy to talk to Monnet in the early stages of the negotiation of the Schuman Plan. It must have been the early summer of 1950.

LT: What were you doing then?

RB: I was McCloy's General Counsel. McCloy, as you remember, was the US High Commissioner in Germany. This meeting was right after the declaration in May [1950] by Schuman, which led to the Schuman Plan -- the Coal & Steel Community. As General Counsel, I was responsible for putting into effect, or managing on behalf of McCloy, the implementation of the law which had been adopted by the [Allied]

High Commission to deconcentrate the coal and steel industry in Germany. I think that was Law 27.

LT: Had you any inkling of the Schuman Declaration before it was made?

RB: No, I learned of it with surprise, but I was immediately interested because of my responsibilities in Germany for the effort to divide up the German coal industry and the steel industry so that they would not be too powerful. And this was a part of the general policy, which had been in effect since WWII, of putting constraints on Germany. It was reflected in the Ruhr authority, and other measures which had grown out of the Potsdam agreement. Well, the thing that was striking about the Schuman Plan to me was that it represented a basic shift of policy toward Germany from the policy which the French had up to that time espoused -- essentially from trying to constrain or hold Germany down to one of trying to integrate Germany and France and the other European countries into a Community. As I saw it, it was a profound, radical shift to a much more constructive approach to the problem.

LT: Well, you certainly saw it in a different light than most of the lawyers who were looking at it from this side of the Atlantic.

RB: Yes, I remember very well conversations in which some Americans viewed it merely as an effort to adopt an official cartel, and were rather cynical about it. But I suppose the fact that we in the Allied High Commission were so close to the whole question of the approach to Germany caused us to see it in a somewhat different light. And as I remember it McCloy too was very enthusiastic for

this proposal. It brings to mind a conversation I had had with Lewis Douglas[1] in about 1945. I was then a Special Assistant to Clay in occupied Germany, when Clay was first Deputy Military Governor, and then later Military Governor.

LT: Was Douglas then in London?

RB: No, Douglas was, before then, in Berlin as a sort of advisor -- a financial advisor -- to Clay. And at that point, Europe was in desperate shape, food was short, coal wasn't being mined in Germany becuase of the lack of props for the mines, and a variety of other things. I remember talking about the situation with Douglas in front of a map of Europe and hearing him say that Europe just cannot exist except as a whole. The needs of the different countries, as he saw it, were so closely interconnected that there was just no way in which Western Europe could be divided and still have prosperity in the different parts. And I remember that very well because it was so clearly recognized by the proposals of Monnet and Schuman. Because of my responsibilities with respect to the coal and steel industry in Germany, McCloy asked me to act as his representative in the period of the negotiations of the Schuman Plan so that we could coordinate the implementation of that law in Germany with the negotiations on the Schuman Plan treaty. Everybody recognized that it was essential that the Germans should not come into this treaty feeling that they had been unduly handicapped by the implementation of the coal and steel law. At the same time, the French were quite clear that they did not wish the Germans to come in unless that law was carried out. And so we

had a problem of trying to work out in Germany an arrangement under the coal and steel law which at least the government leaders there would accept as reasonable and fair to the Germans, so that when the time came to ratify the treaty, there wouldn't be claims that there had been ...

LT: Any selling down the river?

RB: Exactly, by the allies.

LT: So you went to Paris alone that first time ...

RB: That's right.

LT: And introduced yourself to Monnet and said, here I am, I'm McCloy's man?

RB: This was at the rue Matignon, at the offices, suite of offices, which he occupied as the head of the Commissariat du Plan. As I remember it there were a series of offices, they were not large, and they were arranged around a sort of little anteroom. I was ushered into one of these and was told that M. Monnet would be there shortly, and was given a newspaper, which I read. M. Monnet came in. We had a discussion, and thus initiated our relationship. Then he said, "Will you kindly excuse me? I'll be back in a little while." He had given me a document to read, which I did. He came back in about 45 minutes and we resumed our conversation. Only later did I discover that he had visitors in each one of the offices and was acting like a surgeon going around treating a number of patients successively, thus economizing on his time -- excusing himself in each case to go on and take care of the next. I remember that was my introduction to him.

LT: What was the date of that?

RB: I can't remember precisely, but it must have been June ...

LT: Early summer.

RB: Of '50, or something like that. It was very close to the Schuman statement. You remember that Hallstein was named to represent the Germans in the negotiations. I had gotten to know Hallstein in Bonn. So this made for a very easy relationship in my participation in the whole process.

LT: Was Hallstein Secretary of State, or what role did he have then?

RB: He may have been a Secretary of State, or something equivalent. He was in any case a very close adviser to Adenauer, was very much trusted by him and so had direct access to the Chancellor in the whole negotiations.

LT: Yes.

RB: He also helped in working out this rather difficult and awkward problem of Law 27 regarding deconcentration of coal and steel and the relation of that to the Schuman Plan.

LT: What about, did you early on run into some of these colleagues of Monnet, Uri, Guyot, and some of the others?

RB: Yes, I think if not on that first trip almost immediately thereafter. I met Uri, and also Hirsch, and then the man who drafted the treaty -- Lagrange. I cannot remember at this point who was the personal assistant to Monnet. There were one or two others. He had some very loyal secretaries who took great care of him, and were absolutely selfless in their willingness to keep on

working at practically any hour of the day or night.

LT: Did he come to you very often and say, "Now what do you think of this draft we have here, and what about article 80" -- I've forgotten the antitrust articles in the Coal and Steel Community Treaty.

RB: Actually, when they got to the point of where they recognized that something would have to be done about the problem of anti-trust or mergers or that sort of thing, Monnet learned that I had taught antitrust law at Harvard. So he asked me to draft him a couple of articles as a possible basis. I did, and these were turned over to Lagrange, who put them into French treaty language. We talked about these at great length and about the theory and the concept behind them, and he was quite convinced that it was necessary to have some provisions of this sort. The initiative was his not mine. I saw a lot of him in this period. Because of the amount of time I needed to spend in following the negotiations, McCloy's office arranged for me to have a room available in Paris so that I could go down there frequently. I went down, I suppose, on average for two or three days a week. So I saw a lot of him, and once you were accepted by Monnet, he simply brought you in, as if you were one of the party, and no particular distinction was made, so that on many issues, he would simply include me in arguing them out. The negotiations were also being followed for the US by William Tomlinson[2], acting on behalf of Ambassador David Bruce.

LT: Had you met Tomlinson before, or was this the first?

RB: No, this was the first encounter with Tomlinson, but I got to know and respect him, through this whole process. So I spent a very considerable part of the time at the Embassy, with Tomlinson and Stanley Cleveland,[3] and with one or two others, McGrew,[4] as I recall...

LT: "Dangerous Dan" McGrew, the second Treasury man?

RB: Yes, he came on later, as I recall. But in any event, Tomlinson followed the negotiations in detail on behalf of Bruce and he reported to the State Department during the negotiations. I was not representing the US Government, strictly speaking. I was representing McCloy, and in that sense was coming from the Allied High Commission which was in charge of the efforts to deal with post-war Germany.

LT: He was probably being very sensitive to German sentiments.

RB: Yes. We obviously had to take account of the need to assure that the Germans didn't feel forced into the treaty as distinguished from joining voluntarily. And of course Monnet's way of going at things was a big help on that. He didn't create an atmosphere of negotiating on behalf of France with Hallstein. He did, in fact, do what he often has been quoted later as saying: trying to treat issues as problems, which it was a joint task for him and Hallstein and the other negotiators to try to confront and to find solutions for jointly. I think he really managed to create the atmosphere in which that was not just a pretense. Of course there were issues on which the parties differed. The French government wanted certain kinds of things, and the German government wanted other

solutions. But to a very considerable extent, Monnet and Hallstein really did collaborate on finding acceptable solutions. They really did try to sort out different government points of view. They didn't make formal presentations to one another. Essentially they said: "Well, here's what one government wants, there's what the other government wants, how can we find a way of reconciling what they both need and want?"

LT: Don't you think, Bob, that it was also a rather auspicious moment in history when Schuman was there as Foreign Minister, and very sympathetic to this whole notion.

RB: No question about it.

LT: If there had been another administration in power, the story might have been completely different.

RB: I think it would have been. I think there was another factor. After all, this was only five years after the war, and the German government wasn't yet fully established as far as the bureaucracy, the politicians, and so on were concerned. It had only really been in business a little over a year. Therefore you didn't have entrenched bureaucratic positions. And in France, it seemed to me, the experience of the war, and the sense of the failure of the French government in the period before the war, had undercut, in large part, the feelings of intense nationalism. It created a feeling that there was a need to have a different approach to relations within Europe. And so when Schuman took his initiative I think there was a very considerable response among quite a number of Frenchmen in responsible positions who thought this was really

a constructive initiative. And as I say, with only five years to re-install the bureaucracy even in France, there weren't as many entrenched interests as there were later on. Under these conditions, people like Hallstein and Monnet could play a much larger role by reason of Hallstein's relations with Adenauer, and Monnet's relation with Schuman, and I gather, others in the French government. The degree of flexibility which they had to work out solutions and to create something which was novel and unfamiliar was much greater than it would have been a few years later.

LT: Did you get any special feeling for any of these people around Monnet, such as Étienne Hirsch, or Uri?

RB: Oh, yes. They had very distinctive personalities, I remember. Hirsch was a solid person. He was almost peasant-like in his solidity. But he had a twinkle in his eye, a very nice sense of humor, he had a sort of sardonic approach to life, and didn't let himself get excited or wrought up, although he had very definite views and was a very staunch fellow. He struck me as very balanced, very valuable for the team. He was in sharp contrast to Uri, who was highly imaginative, brilliant, and highly articulate and pretty vain, and a bit inclined, when he got an idea he liked, to push the idea to the limit. And Hirsch was not somebody you could push around. He was, I think a very good balance wheel to Uri, who was also a very valuable member of the group, because he was full of ideas, inventive and imaginative, with a brilliant analytical mind, although not always, in my opinion, on the right track.

LT: René Mayer once observed that Monnet was one of the few people who was able to handle Uri and use him as the kind of intelligent instrument that he could be.

RB: He was able to use both of them, and he had obviously the loyalty of both of them, but he was also able to use so many people. His capacity to draw out of people whatever they had to contribute in the way of knowledge or judgement or intelligence was really quite remarkable. And he used them in a very particular way. He didn't simply adopt their ideas; he insisted on talking through any idea or proposal that he was interested in until he finally reached his own conviction and was clear about what was valid and what wasn't. And he had infinite patience in going over something again and again. He would talk it out and then the next time you'd see him he'd talk it out again. And what you finally discovered was that he was trying to be sure that he was on solid ground, that he'd thought it through, that he'd walked around it sufficiently to be certain that he'd be prepared to back it. But also he was exploring how to simplify it, how to get it down to the fundamentals. Besides talking it out, he would have a paper drafted. He might have it drafted ten or twelve times, and the differences would be very small, from one time to the next. He was seeking a formulation with which he felt comfortable.

LT: It almost seems as though he were searching for the perfect aphorism.

RB: That's right. It was clear that he was thinking about how

he was going to present it to somebody whom he saw himself as persuading to adopt it. This was part of his technique of dealing with leaders -- and persuading them to do things and convincing them that they ought to do things. I never saw him actually carrying out this role, but I saw it at one remove. In part, he spent this large amount of time in making sure that he himself was completely convinced of the soundness of the proposal that he was making. Secondly, by this practice or technique of talking it out, and reformulating it, he was sure he had it in the simplest and most direct way to present it to somebody who wasn't necessarily familiar with it. So he accomplished really two things at once, I think. He arrived at a solid position in his own mind, and to a formulation, which he thought would be persuasive and convincing, to somebody whom he wanted to take action.

LT: It's been said, by a number of people who knew Monnet well that he had an unerring sense of where power lay, and how to get to it. It sounds like a rather enviable quality.

RB: Well, he did, and I don't know exactly what the basis of this was. Of course in the time when I saw him, he was already a man who had established himself in public life in a quiet way, known to people of importance in a variety of stages of his career. He had played an important role in WWI, well beyond his age, and he played an important role in WWII, after the fall of France; and in between he'd been an investment banker in a major firm in New York. In these varied activities he'd come in contact with a lot of important people. He must have impressed them favorably

with his abilities and his dedication. But I think that the other factor was that he was prepared to work behind the scenes. He was prepared, in considerable part, to let other people get the credit, and so this gave him a certain value and access to leaders if they felt he was giving them proposals or ideas which made sense, and which might indeed redound to their credit. Still, having said that, I think his ability to convice leaders of his seriousness and of his integrity and of his value to them -- and to persuade them to do things that he wanted them to do -- was remarkable. I don't know that I've ever seen anybody with that same ability, certainly not to the same degree.

LT: I must say, parenthetically, I remember when he came to Washington a month after Kennedy won office, I met him, and he asked me who was the most important man next to Kennedy, and I said: "I suppose it's Arthur Schlesinger." He said, "Indeed it is not, it's a young man named Sorenson." Of course he'd already been asking every friend he possibly could in Paris for weeks: "Well, whom should I really see?" You know, he stayed for two weeks, and by that time had had luncheon with Kennedy two or three times and dinner with him at least once or twice, so he did have that marvelous ability. Well. Where do you think he's going to stand, in his time? Are historians going to treat him well?

RB: Well, he was not a man who left any legacy of writings which people would refer to, except for the Memoirs, which were largely composed by Fontaine. But obviously, with so much help by Monnet, they read the way Monnet sounded. I think that will be looked on

as an interesting source for much of this period. I believe that his real monument will be in Europe itself. I think that people are too prone to say, well, he was trying to get a united Europe, a federal Europe, and he failed. Certainly as of now, Europe is far from being a federal Europe. I think it was partly a matter of timing. As I described a moment ago, the climate in 1950 was so fortuitous. But it was nowhere near as good as time went on. There were the delays caused by the UK, and also then by DeGaulle. By the time we were into the '60's, the bureaucratic structures and the politicians were much more entrenched. They were much more conscious of national identity than they had been 15 years before. There's no question about it, the concept of a federal Europe could not be said to be terribly far advanced at this moment. However, it's for history to say whether or not that will come to some sort of fruition. I don't know. But suppose that it doesn't. It seems to me that Monnet probably is more responsible than any other person for having shifted the course of policy in Europe from the essentially negative aim of trying to keep Germany from becoming a threat to its neighbors to one of linking Germany into cooperative relations with the other major countries in Europe. What's happened since 1950 in Europe -- the peaceful relations, the cooperation, the economic growth, the prosperity -- is in a very considerable degree traceable to the initiatives in which he was really the moving force. The Schuman Plan changed the whole direction of the policy within Europe. The Common Market certainly created the basis for removing the economic

barriers, or treating the whole continent as a unit for economic purposes. Political and economic cooperation, and in a sense, the unity of Europe, is very largely based on his efforts. Not by himself, obviously, for they never would have even gotten started if Schuman hadn't been willing to endorse them. I don't think the measures would have worked anywhere near as effectively for a decade if Adenauer hadn't been the leader in Germany, and there were others in the smaller countries, like Spaak in Belgium...

LT: De Gasperi.

RB: De Gasperi, in Italy, and others who happened to be in power. But still, the fellow who recognizes that there's the possibility, and then finds a practical way to capitalize on it, it seems to me, has really made a major contribution. That was what was special about Monnet. He combined two qualities which don't often come together in one human personality. One was, he was really able to commit himself to quite large purposes, long-term purposes, like the unification of Europe. He had no illusions, I think, that this was going to be something easy or quick. But he was not embarrassed at espousing a vision of a Europe that would be utterly different than what it had been in the earlier period of bitter rivalry and hostility, and what he called "civil wars." But then, you know, lots of people have had large visions. He had this second quality, namely a pragmatic capacity for finding the way to make progress, how to get ahead toward the long-term goal by practical steps. That kind of pragmatism is found in others too, but ofttimes it isn't joined to any larger set of purposes.

LT: François Duchêne once remarked that perhaps the one unique quality of Monnet was that his real genius lay in his ability to limit himself to about two forward steps ahead and never to allow peripheral things to cloud the main objective. Never look three or four steps ahead, because that was already too far.

RB: That's right. Yet it would be quite wrong to say that he didn't have in his head an overreaching purpose -- of trying to unify Europe, and to bring about a totally new structure in Europe. Because he wasn't satisfied merely with cooperation, as in the OECD, or the sort of thing that the British favored; he was determined that the changes would be more structural, more institutional. That was there, as a fundamental purpose. At the same time he was able to move back from that and say, "Well, all right, now what is it we can do today, and the next day, and the day after that would be practical, and on the road to that goal. It would be something that you could hope to accomplish in a manageable time." That's where he was willing to spend an inordinate amount of time -- finding where was the right place to take hold. Then in doggedly pursuing that, he would not let himself be deflected into other activities. He was totally single-minded, once he had fastened on to what was to be the next step. He just wouldn't let himself be deflected by other worthy purposes, or interesting issues that might come along. This doggedness was a distinguishing quality of the man. So many people are easily deflected. When they hit an obstacle, they move to something else, or change the approach or something. Monnet wasn't that way. When he hit an obstacle

he set his mind to how he could get around it, over it, or outwait it. At any event, he didn't let it deter him from what he saw as the next measure to be taken. I thought also that he had hold of a very fundamental point when he said, "If you do take a positive step forward in an awkward or difficult or complex situation, you change the situation by that step. The effects of that may open up new possibilities for further steps which had not been feasible before." And I think that the experience with Europe has shown that.

LT: He once used a metaphor about climbing a mountain. He said that with every step you commanded a new view and the world looked a little different. A unique Monnet notion was that if you want to solve a problem, and if there's no framework for solving it, you create a larger framework wherein you're solving other problems and also that one, which hitherto had not seemed soluable. That is the way natural scientists tackle problems. Well, I suppose we could go on for a long time, Bob, you've I think really come to the heart of Monnet. Is there something else you want to comment on? Are there some fitting anecdotes you recall?

RB: Well, I think I can scrape up two or three. One is not exactly an anecdote, but does tell a bit about Monnet's priorities, or at least the priorities of Madame Monnet. As you probably know,

Monnet was selected by Harvard to receive an honorary degree. One of the Harvard rules is that the recipient has to come to the commencement exercises in order to receive it. They won't give it to you in absentia. So the University voted it one year and invited him to come. But something developed either with the Action Committee or some other crisis so he cancelled the trip. So, next year, the University again voted him an honorary degree and invited him once more to come to the commencement. Once more he planned to come. This time, his daughter was expecting a child. She was expected to give birth to the child on precisely the day on which the commencement fell. Whatever his own wishes were (they may well have been to remain home by her side), Madame Monnet thought it was out of order for him not to be there at home that day in case the daughter's child was born. So he didn't come that time either. I think the Harvard Corporation decided that he was not a good risk. They did not vote it a third time.

LT: Was she the daughter about whom he had so much concern for so many years, about her political leanings?

RB: I'm not sure which one it was. In any event, Madame Monnet was very adamant that he wasn't to leave the soil of France while the birth was impending.

LT: People have commented that Monnet rarely talked about or characterized other people. I'd not found this particularly true. Did you ever find him characterizing any of the people of his time, such as DeGaulle and others?

RB: My feeling was that he was rather chary of characterizing other people. I was thinking particularly of his attitude toward DeGaulle. You will recall that he had worked with him when DeGaulle went to England. Then, of course, after Monnet became so much involved in trying to create a united Europe, DeGaulle's attitude especially from '58 on was really a major obstacle to any progress. I sometimes tried to get him to express his feelings toward DeGaulle in casual conversation. I was surprised that he didn't allow himself to express strong feelings. It was clear, obviously, that DeGaulle was seen as a serious obstacle. Nevertheless, he avoided adjectives about him. Perhaps he was being prudent. He may have thought he would have a chance to persuade DeGaulle to modify his position. But it did seem to me that he was less forthright in talking about somebody like DeGaulle than I would have expected. Was that your experience?

LT: Yes, he showed sort of a restraint. He once talked to me about his wartime experiences in North Africa, of being briefly with DeGaulle, and of the kind of problems that they had, dealing with each other. But he did not go into any great detail.

RB: He tended to be factual, rather than to characterize.

LT: That's right.

RB: He didn't really use many adjectives. He either controlled his feelings or simply didn't allow himself to have strong feelings in matters which later might be important in terms of what he wanted to accomplish. I never really heard him express very strong emotion in any way. It was obvious he felt warmly about

particular individuals and, in particular, about his family. He would sometimes express these feelings by acts of special consideration. I very seldom heard him put into words either warm feelings toward others, or hostility.

LT: True. He once asked me, at the outset of the Kennedy administration, what did I think of Douglas Dillon. And, because I tend to characterize everyone, I said, "Well, I think he's a very nice, charming chap, but just don't know how able he is in this particular job." And Monnet was silent for a minute, and said, "I think he's probably going to do a very good job. I knew his father very well, he was an excellent man."

RB: He was able to convey a strong feeling of friendship, hospitality and cordiality, and even of intimacy in a certain sense. I remember one episode very well. One summer I took my family to tour for about 8 weeks in Europe, in France mainly. When we came to Paris, Monnet suggested that I bring the whole family to dinner with them, the two boys, about ten or twelve, and my wife. He'd met my wife before but he'd never seen the boys. At dinner I was struck by how much he focused his attention on the youngsters and made them feel that he was interested in what they did, what they liked, what they wanted to do, and how they'd enjoyed France.

Another episode was amusing. One time, when he was reminiscing with me about living in the United States during the war, he said one of the things he'd come to love was Boston baked beans. Six or eight months later, in the middle of a meal I was having

with just him and Madame Monnet in the country, he suddenly recalled the baked beans, and insisted that the cook prepare us some of the baked beans. So we interrupted this delicious French meal by a course of baked beans. It seemed to me rather bizarre. But he ate them with great relish.

LT: His taste in food was extraordinary. As he got older, of course, he got much more conscious of his diet, and I know Max Kohnstann, who traveled quite a bit with him, complained that he was always worried about Monnet getting down to the restaurant before he did, if they were eating at the same place, because Monnet would invariably order hamburgers, ordinary American-type hamburgers, and order them for Max too. And then he told me that he would frequently bring back with him, or have sent back, cases of V-8 juice, years before they had that in Europe. Another thing he liked was clam chowder.

Did you ever recall his referring to any book that he'd ever read?

RB: No, I don't. I didn't think of Monnet as having any particular interest in books at all. He struck me as getting most of his information from discussion, talk, pulling it out of people, and having somebody else to do any writing. He seemed to abstain from any systematic reading, as far as I could see, or any extensive writing. I was very surprised, actually, one time when he presented me with a gift of a book after I had done something for him out of the ordinary. It was a copy of de Tocqueville on _America_, in French, which he must have had leatherbound himself.

LT: One time, he said, "Of course you've read the autobiography of Ibn Saud, have you not?" And I said, "No, I haven't," and he said, "Oh, you must have read it." He said, "There's a part in there where he describes having great self-doubt, and so he goes into the desert, and fasts several days, to find God again. And he finds God, and God tells him, 'Bless even thine enemies, because even they will be of help to thee.'" Well it was just at the time when DeGaulle had come back into power, and so he says, "You know, that's a very important thing." Later François Duchêne told me that he'd just given him the book with that page open.

RB: There's just one other episode that sheds a little light on his persistence. When I was in Germany with McCloy, my wife and I drove down to the Riviera, to a small resort for a vacation. After two or three days, Monnet was on the phone. He had tracked me down to insist that I come back to Paris to help him solve some crisis that wouldn't wait. Anything that was urgent to him was urgent to the whole state of the world. It was out of the question to delay for a week of vacation. In any event, I was young and gullible, and he persuaded me that it was important. But I said to him, "Well, look, I've got my wife, I've got my car, it'll take me two days to drive back to Paris, it'll have to keep that long." And he said, "Oh, that's not necessary, just fly." And I said, "Well, I'm not going to let my wife drive back across France, so that I can come back on the airplane." "Well," he said, "you drive her part way; then you take the airplane and let her drive

on to Lyons. And meanwhile I will send my chauffeur down to Lyons and he'll drive her back from Lyons to Paris." And he did indeed arrange for this elaborate procedure.

LT: He did that to Kohnstamm. He was in Luxembourg, and I know that the Kohnstamms liked to regard their weekends as inviolable, but it was very, very difficult when Monnet was in town.

Well, I suppose we could go on reminiscing about him. Anecdotes are really a nice way to preserve some of the flavor and personality of a person.

RB: I think one aspect of the personality of Monnet could have been caught best with a movie camera, which could have gotten pictures of him tramping across the countryside, out there in Bazoche. When he got on his special walking outfit, his great big boots and his large coat and --

LT: And his walking stick.

RB: And his walking stick, I think he was very much in the character which he saw for himself. The route would take him along ploughed fields, and he would stop every so often and ostentatiously fill his lungs with life-giving fresh air, available only in this rural setting. He was kind of creating a character, but he was doing it for himself in part, I think. Apparently this morning walk for an hour or so was the way he sorted out thoughts and planned what he was going to do that day. And if someone was with him he would talk out whatever problem was then on his mind.

LT: That was one of the reasons he liked to stay at the Westchester, because he said it was right near the park.

RB: Where he could walk, yes.

LT: Well, thanks very much, Bob, it was very nice of you to take up all that time.

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Footnotes

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[1]Lewis Douglas was U.S. ambassador to Great Britain from 1947 to 1950.

Page 6

[2]William D. Tomlinson, chief U.S. Treasury representative in Paris, died in 1957.

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[3]Stanley M. Cleveland was financial officer in Paris from 1949 to 1951.

[4]Donald J. McGrew was the assistant U.S. Treasury representative in Paris.

CURRICULUM VITAE

Robert R. Bowie

Personal Background

Born (1909) and grew up in Baltimore
1931 - Princeton University A.B. s.c.l.
1934 - Harvard Law School LLB m.c.l.
Married the former Theodosia Chapman;
two sons, Robert Jr., and William Chapman.

Law Practice and Army (1934-46)

1934-42 - Practiced law with Bowie & Burke, Baltimore
1941-42 - Assistant Attorney General of Maryland
1942-46 - U.S. Army, Legal Division, Services of Supply and Germany; discharged as Colonel; awarded Legion of Merit with Oak Leaf Cluster.

Academic Career (1946-80, with leaves for public service)

1946-55 - Professor of Law, Harvard University
1957-72 - Organized and served as Director of Harvard Center for International Affairs
1957-80 - Clarence Dillon Professor of International Affairs, Harvard University.

Federal Service (1945-79)

1945-46 - Special Assistant, General Lucius Clay Deputy Military Governor for Germany
1950-51 - General Counsel and Special Advisor to John J. McCloy, U.S. High Commissioner for Germany
1953-57 - Director of Policy Planning (U.S. Department of State) and Assistant Secretary of State (1955-57).
1966-68 - Counselor, U.S. Department of State
1977-79 - Deputy Director of CIA for National Intelligence.

Also consultant from time to time to Departments of State and Defense, CIA, and National Science Advisor.

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Publications

Studies in Federalism (1954) (Co-author and Editor with Carl J. Friedrich)
Ideology and Foreign Affairs - for Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (1960) (co-author)
The European Community and the United States (1961) - for Joint Economic Committee of U.S. Congress (co-author)
Shaping the Future (1963) - The Radner Lectures at Columbia University
Suez 1956 (1974) (Oxford Press)

Articles on foreign policy and international affairs in journals, and symposia, and in the Christian Science Monitor.

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