

Interview with Stanley Cleveland for the Jean Monnet Foundation, Lausanne. June 12, 1981, in Washington, D.C.

Leonard Tennyson: Stanley, you knew Monnet rather early, in relation to his post-war associations with Americans. What were the circumstances under which you met him? I gather that you met him in Paris, did you not?

Stanley Cleveland: I met him exactly on the ninth of May, 1950. It's easy to remember the date.

LT: That was the same day as the...

SC: ...the day of the Declaration. And the circumstances were more or less like this: I was working at the time in the Embassy in Paris as one of the members of a combined State Department-ECA-Treasury group, under Tommy [William] Tomlinson who was in the Treasury at the time.

LT: ECA being the Marshall Plan?

SC: ECA being the Marshall Plan. We were a single group. Tommy was very much a leading man in the Embassy, very close to the Ambassador. He had worked closely with the French government in relationship to everything concerning the Marshall Plan, including the whole planning process.

LT: What was William Tomlinson's job officially there?

SC: Officially he was U.S. Treasury representative. But in fact he had three hats. He was Treasury representative -- an employee of the Treasury, paid by the Treasury; he was the Director of financial and trade affairs for the ECA (Marshall Plan) mission to France, not the international ECA organization but the mission to

France; and perhaps most important he was financial adviser and close collaborator with the Ambassador. Thus he had an Embassy function. He was in fact the man dealing with financial and trade matters who really counted in the Embassy even though we had a separate economic section. I technically belonged to the economic section but in fact I worked for Tommy.

LT: I didn't mean to digress this way, but I wanted to get this straight because of Tommy's interesting relationship with Monnet in that period. So please go ahead.

SC: I'd like to say a little more about Tommy as long as we're on the subject. He was an extraordinary man. He was the only authentic genius I've ever known, an incredible fellow who at the age of about 33 or 34 was one of the most important American officials in Europe. It was a position he had earned for himself by the way he manipulated the French situation during the Marshall Plan period. Without going into detail, he had done this by a combination of using the external pressures of the United States government combined with an extraordinary penetration of the French bureaucracy. This included both the Ministry of Finance and Monnet's Plan. These were the real economic power centers in the French government. They were very hostile to each other yet Tommy got on well with both of them. He had a capacity for working with people for a singular objective regardless of who happened to be paying their salary or even what government they were working for.

Here is a common trait which was one reason why he and Monnet got along so well together. Anyway, I was working for Tommy at this time. Actually, I was the Embassy's economic liason man with Tommy's group.

On about 3 or 4 o'clock in the afternoon of the 9th of May, 1950, I was called up to the Political Section of the Embassy. They had just received a press release issued by Foreign Minister Robert Schuman. They wanted it translated but apparently there was nobody around who could do the translating job. So I grabbed the piece of paper. It looked exciting. I brought it down and showed it to Tommy. He said, "OK, I'll give you ten minutes to get it translated." Then he said, "This looks like Monnet." This was exactly his words: "This looks like Monnet."

LT: Are you saying that Tomlinson had not been at all forewarned that Schuman was going to come out with the declaration?

SC: That's right, as far as I could tell. He obviously had intimations that Monnet and his group were working on something. But he was unaware, as far as I could tell, of the timing or indeed of the contents until that time. At least, that was my impression at the time. I have never known of anything to change that impression.

LT: And ...?

SC: The same, I think, was true of Bruce,¹ Acheson,² and the others. Certainly if Bruce had known, Tommy would have know.

LT: Yes.

SC: And Bruce was the most likely one to have known, of any

American official. Therefore, as I say, there may have been intimations as to what was going on, behind the scenes. But it was a very well-kept secret.

LT: David Bruce was the Ambassador from when to when? Do you recall the dates?

SC: Well, I arrived in the fall of 1949, and I think he had been Ambassador for about a year, but of course he had been there since the beginning of the Marshall Plan as Mission Chief -- Marshall Plan Mission Chief.

LT: Oh, he was?

SC: Yes, it was very interesting. He was appointed by Paul Hoffman as Mission Chief at the beginning of the Marshall Plan. He had experience in France during the war and after the war. He was, among other things, connected with the OSS.³ Although David was reasonably well connected, he was not a very rich man. He did not have anything like the political position of his brother, who was very rich. Nobody in the world would have thought that he would have been appointed as Ambassador -- especially to the prize post of Paris. But when the Ambassador, who I believe was Caffrey,⁴ left in late 1948, it was a pretty crucial time in French history, Acheson apparently decided that it was time for a merit appointment. And David, by that time, had developed such a strong position with the French in part because of the work of Tomlinson that there was just no way of appointing anyone else.

LT: Well, let's get back to that fateful day of May 9th, 1950.

SC: History will recall that there had been talks in Paris before then in which Acheson and Bruce participated. I believe that's right. And on the tenth of May, I believe it was, there was to open in London a tripartite Foreign Ministers meeting, at which were to be present the Foreign Ministers and also from the American side Bruce and McCloy. The latter would attend because the principal subject was to be Germany. But I'll come back to that ...

Well, in any case, I brought the release to Tommy after I'd translated it quickly. It was then sent up to Political Section for them to send out as a telegram to Washington. Tommy said: "Come on, let's go over to Rue de Matignon and find out what's going on." We arrived, and we plunged into an absolute maelstrom. The place was crawling with people. Everybody knew by that time -- at least on the French side -- where this startling declaration of the French government had really come from. Everyone was rushing around to Monnet to find out what would happen next.

LT: And the press conference had already been held at the Matignon earlier that day, had it not?

SC: That's right, the press conference had already been held, the announcement made, and Schuman had then gotten on a plane and gone off to London.

LT: I didn't know that Schuman had gone to London.

SC: Yes, he went to attend the tripartite meeting.

LT: Because Monnet had gone there with Etienne Hirsch.

SC: Schuman's flight had nothing to do with the Schuman plan. This was for a long-scheduled tripartite Foreign Ministers meeting. The Monnet/Hirsch trip, which I think took place after the announcement, was to try to get the British to join.

LT: Oh, yes.

SC: But of course the announcement came at a crucial time -- demanding an immediate reaction. Yes, I remember now, if this is relevant. The reaction in the Embassy was interesting. Robert Terrill, who was the acting Economic Counselor, and the economic people generally, immediately took the view that this was just another cartel, a European cartel scheme for coal and steel.

LT: Now that was a rather general view --

SC: In the State Department.

LT: No, but I also found it publicly, in this country, as the idea first came out.

SC: Yes, it probably was. Of course I wasn't here, so I --

LT: I wasn't here either but I remember reading about it in the American press.

SC: I think that's right, because the subject was coal and steel. There had been so much talk about cartelization and de-cartelization of steel particularly in West Germany. It was the first reaction of the State Department, as it came out in cables from the State Department.

Bruce, to his undying credit, immediately seized upon the political importance of the proposal even though he was skeptical of the complex motives of the French government. Nevertheless, he

weighed in very heavily for the proposal in a cable which he wrote from London a couple of hours later (Chip Bolen, who was chargé, had happily killed Terrill's cable, or the Embassy would have had a very red face). It was after Tommy and I had had our first talk with Monnet. We confirmed that it was Monnet's initiative and explained to Bruce by phone what the objective was.

LT: You talked to Monnet at that time? To whom/did you talk?
else

SC: We talked essentially with Monnet, Hirsch and Uri. They were the key people. Bruce stressed the importance of the plan in a cable to the Department and in conversation with Acheson in London. He flew over to London to support his view and explain that it was essential that Americans positively react to the proposal despite the strong skepticism of the U.S. government establishment.

This is an important point because people have said that the Schuman Plan was really a covert American idea. Acheson in fact was very skeptical (as he was of almost anything of French origin) but he went along. Bruce was enthusiastic, McCloy was also enthusiastic. But the State Department as an organization was opposed. Indeed it remained skeptical for a considerable period afterwards. The organization in the U.S. which was almost immediately in favor, because the Schuman proposal essentially went along with Paul Hoffman's original idea, was the Marshall Plan organization, particularly the Marshall Plan organization in Washington, under Hoffman and Dick Bissell.

LT: Well, that's --

SC: I don't want to get too much off into the U.S. side --

LT: No, no, and we don't want to lose track of the U.S. reaction. Let me get back to Monnet now. Monnet, as I understand was a consummately successful lobbyist for his idea among the Americans in those days. Can you talk a little bit about some of his techniques -- how he lobbied?

SC: Well, if I can go back a little from the specific question, because there's something I've given a good deal of thought to. The essential thing about Monnet's effectiveness as a lobbyist, whether with the Americans, with the Europeans, with the French, with anybody, was what you might call the Monnet method. And I don't know if others have talked about it in quite those terms.

The Monnet method was quite special. Monnet never wrote anything in his life, as far as I know; he developed the ideas and let other people write them up for him. But whenever Monnet attacked a new problem he would gather a bunch of people around him. Some of them would be his intimates -- Hirsch, Uri -- people who were close to him, Tommy, when he was alive, and others. Some would be people he hardly knew but had somehow laid his hands on. They knew a lot about the particular subject. He would begin a sort of nonstop kaffeeklatsch. It could go on sometimes for a period of one or two weeks -- hours and hours a day. It generally started out with a rambling discussion of the subject in which relevant facts would be brought out. People would begin to argue (these were a very argumentative bunch). Gradually two or three different approaches and positions would develop in the group. Monnet would remain silent, occasionally provoking reaction, but not saying much.

LT: What we call brainstorming.

SC: Yes, it was a kind of brainstorming. Monnet would sit back and probe people to make sure that the conversation kept moving. These were strong-minded, imaginative people of different approaches. Hirsch and Uri were perfect examples. Hirsch was the quiet, contemplative, wise man, and Uri was absolutely brilliant, but not always wise. There were combinations of various types of people such as these. They would take very strong positions and argue like fury with each other.

Monnet would listen, occasionally throwing a word in. Then gradually, as the conversation developed -- and it often took several days or even a week before this happened -- gradually he began venturing a little statement of his own. Usually it was a very simple statement, just a few words, almost a slogan. It distilled, out of all this argument among highly verbal, brilliant people, a couple of kernels of an idea. These he would throw into the conversation. Then people would react to him. Gradually Monnet would begin to expose a little more in a few sentences and then in a couple of paragraphs. The process then was that people in the group who had been arguing against each other would all turn against him. They would argue with him, indicating all the things that were wrong about what he was saying. Monnet would listen, reformulate his ideas -- taking into account what somebody had said, refusing to heed what somebody else had said. It was like taking a rough piece of stone and gradually chipping

the edges off it until it became a sculpture. The latter part of the process contained the crucible of the argument. He was with people he trusted. They, at the same time, had absolutely no hesitation in telling him that he was full of nonsense -- and sometimes he was.

At this point he would begin to come out with a formulated concept, an idea. It was usually action-oriented and contained all of the necessary elements. Then he would go through what was, in some ways, the most excruciating part of the process. Yet it was the ultimate refinement. Monnet would go on, saying the same thing, over and over again, in practically the same words, occasionally modifying a detail to take account of a legitimate criticism. People would still argue with him but gradually the arguments would die out because he would have taken into account all of the legitimate arguments that were made. In the end there was almost always a consensus. But -- more important than a consensus -- there was in Monnet's head, and ready to put on paper, a perfectly formulated idea. It had been through so much of the process of discussion that all of the counter-arguments had been made and the basic concept tested in the fire.

Monnet was ready, at that point -- he had not been briefed by somebody who had told him what to think -- he had developed the idea. It had grown out of a distillation process involving many people, then a refinement process, and finally a tempering process of testing all the arguments out. So then he was prepared to

present it to anybody who was ready to listen to reason on the subject -- and specifically to men who had the power to do something about it.

LT: You've put that very well. I've heard it described by other people but not so thoroughly. I think that it does hit it right on the nose. Well, let's go on, now. Is there, are there any particular incidents that occurred during that period that you would like to dwell on?

SC: Let me say one more thing. I gave you the background for answering your question but I didn't quite answer it. I think that there are several reasons for Monnet's ability to be effective with Americans, as well as Europeans. One is that he was totally without national prejudice. He saw people as they were. Yet he had his roots sunk very deeply in France, he was, in many ways (as people have said) a good French peasant. He had those deep roots. You could feel them. Yet he had spent so much of his life in other parts of the world, including the Anglo-Saxon world, that he was able to communicate, not only linguistically in English, but in terms of U.S. mentality with Americans. Less so with the British. Perhaps there's just a natural incompatibility between the British and the French way of viewing things. He was not as effective with the British as he was with Americans.

With the latter he was enormously effective. He had, over the years of his living in the United States and working with Americans, developed a large number of close friends and acquaintances in high places who had great respect for him. He had an

ability, even when he hadn't known somebody previously, to take him into his camp. Even though they knew that they were talking with a thorough-going Frenchman, they felt they could communicate with him. I know, as somebody who spent the better part of his life interpreting between Americans and Frenchmen that it's extremely difficult. There's a real cultural gap which makes it very hard for people to communicate with each other. The systems of thought, the ways of approaching a problem, are different. Monnet, though French, tended to have what might be called an Anglo-Saxon or American approach to problems. It was pragmatic, going from facts to a conclusion rather than from a conclusion to the facts. He was more effective than any other Frenchman in communicating with Americans.

LT: You may recall that a mutual friend of ours once remarked: "Well, one of the reasons for Monnet's genius is that he never suffered a classical French education."

SC: I think that's right, absolutely right. He was relatively uneducated, in that sense, and it was probably a good thing because he was not forced into Cartesian categories.

LT: And so he did have this pragmatic cast of mind. Did he ever talk with you and Tommy about his time in China? I've often wondered what he gained from that experience and whether it left a lasting impression on him.

SC: The short answer is no, I don't recollect his having talked much about it, although I heard something occasionally from other

people. To digress even a little from this digression, I remember, I think it was his 80th birthday party in Paris, which would have been around, I guess, the early '60's. It was an extraordinary assemblage. There were people there from almost every aspect of his life except perhaps from the first World War part. There were people who went back to his period in the League of Nations, to his China experience, to his Wall Street years in the late '20's and early '30's. The variety of the things he had done in his life was graphically illustrated at the affair. There were people who were in their nineties down to people who were in their early thirties.

I would like to tell you a little bit about Monnet's Wall Street years as I heard it from him one day.

LT: I wish you would. If this exercise started by Henri Rieben could have been started about fifteen years ago it would have been marvelous. There were so many people still alive then who knew Monnet back in the early days. Let's have this little story.

SC: I can't reproduce it in detail. Sometime in the early '50's I took my brother Harlan, who was at that time, a senior official with the Marshall Plan in Washington, to meet Monnet. It was on a weekend, and we had lunch at his country home and spent four or five hours with him. We talked about Europe, and various other things. For some reason Monnet started telling the story of his Wall Street years. It was interesting because it was the story of a failure, one of his few real failures. He told it in all its gory detail, with amusement, almost detachment,

though he had been centrally involved. It was the story of how he was rolled by Giannini,⁵ he and a couple of his banking partners.

LT: What do you mean, "rolled"?

SC: Well, I mean in the sense that he was "taken for a ride."

Not good English, but ...

LT: Taken for a ride financially?

SC: What happened was more than that. It almost put an end to his career.

LT: Giannini was at that time president of the Bank of America?

SC: That's right. He had created the Bank of America, or the Trans-America Company, which at that time owned the Bank of America. And it was a typical 1920's type operation with about 80 percent water. It consisted of piling one thing on top of another. Its base consisted of the savings of all the little Italians in California. On that base, he had built a financial superstructure which was three, four, or five times as heavy as the actual real money involved could bear. And I think it was in the spring of 1929 that Giannini managed to persuade Monnet and, I think, two of his partners -- I don't know who they were nor the name of the company --

LT: Blair and Company.

SC: Blair, right. He and his two partners had bought control of a holding company which essentially was involved with the bank and its financial undertaking. Apparently they didn't have an idea of what they were getting into. Well, the crash came and it was an absolute disaster. They were faced with the problem of squeezing

the water out of this enormous financial holding and reducing it -- in fact writing off probably 60 to 70 percent of the phoney assets which were on the books. They didn't own one hundred percent of the company. The stockholders were mainly little people all over California who had their life savings tied up in it. So they had the task of telling all of these people what had happened to them. They did this over a couple of years, amid mounting unpopularity. At one point Monnet said that he was the only one of the three who dared to go to San Francisco. The Mafia had threatened to lynch them because nearly every Italian in California had money invested in Trans-America. And it was then that Giannini, who had been sitting off on the sidelines, moved in and waged a proxy fight against them. It was done to the enthusiastic plaudits of the multitudes he had bilked. Of course, he had pulled out just in time to let the others take the blame. He then succeeded in moving back into control of the operation. The others left with their tails between their legs. Monnet told this story in great detail even though it reflected poorly on his financial wisdom, at least at the time. He, nonetheless, recounted it with amusement and he obviously felt he had learned some lessons from it. During that period on Wall Street, he had learned how the American system worked and had acquired a large number of important contacts. One of these was John Foster Dulles who subsequently proved to be very useful.

LT: And McCloy, Swatland, and Dillon's father.

SC: Yes, that's right.

LT: A Wall Street lawyer, who dealt with him in those days, described Monnet with obvious affection as "that fox." Monnet, I'm sure, was regarded by his American peers in those days as being a rather competent operator.

SC: Oh, I think that's probably right. The only insight on his Wall Street period I have comes from this story he told. I'm sure that Monnet could have been quite ruthless when he was pursuing an objective. The objectives he sought when I knew him were all public objectives. Presumably he was as pragmatic and as ruthless pursuing private objectives.

LT: Let's go back now. I wonder whether you'd like to talk a little bit about that period after the Schuman Declaration leading up to the treaty of Paris, and Monnet's increasing relationships with Americans at that time -- his lobbying effort. Perhaps you'd also like to talk about some of the people who surrounded Monnet -- those who he brought into his circle. I'm thinking not only of Pierre Uri, Etienne Hirsch, but some of the others.

SC: The Schuman Plan negotiations were quite fascinating, because they were unlike any other international negotiations. Monnet was head of the French delegation. But he never viewed himself as being the French delegation. He viewed himself as being chairman of a committee whose function it was to come out with a consensus result. So he negotiated with the rest of the French government just as objectively as with anybody else. Indeed, the Foreign Office, which was deeply opposed to what he was doing, was, to all intents and purposes, out of the affair completely.

Monnet's relationship to the government which he technically represented was almost entirely with the Foreign Minister Schuman, and with two civil servants outside of his own circle. One was Bernard Clappier, who was the Directeur de Cabinet to Schuman. He, in a sense, was the midwife of the Schuman Plan, because he was the one who brought Schuman and Monnet together. And there was François Valéry, who, at that time, was quite a junior man in the economic side of the Foreign Office. He was responsible for following German economic affairs. He was the only one among regular Foreign Office people who was admitted into Monnet's inner circle.

LT: He was Paul Valéry's son?

SC: He was. I don't know what he does now, I think he runs a foundation in France. He was an interesting character in himself.

LT: How long did Schuman stay in the job of Foreign Minister after the Declaration?

SC: Well, at least through the period of the Schuman Plan. I don't really remember exactly, but I think he certainly survived up into the beginning of 1952. It may have been even longer than that. In any case, he remained Foreign Minister through that whole period, and he defended his policies against the rest of the French government when necessary. Monnet relied on Schuman for protection against the French government interference and against the French bureaucracy. His relations with the French bureaucracy were fairly cold. But he functioned because he was protected by Schuman and supported by Pleven, and one or two others such as René Mayer. He did have a few other good contacts in the Civil Service. Others

were people who had at one time or another worked in the Plan and then had moved on to other things -- such as Paul Delouvrier who, I believe, was at that time in charge of tax reform. He was an important man in the Finance Ministry and was regarded as René Mayer's pet civil servant. There were others of that type, but generally speaking he kept an arm's length relationship with the rest of the French government. His method of operation was to deal with things on an issue-by-issue basis as they came along during the negotiations. He was, incidentally, no particular respecter of who paid whose salary. He made a particular effort at the beginning of the negotiations to establish a close relationship with the Germans. He felt it was absolutely essential to maintain a relationship of confidence between the French and the Germans. He regarded this as the key to making the negotiations work. The whole objective, after all, was to create a Franco-German parity relationship and bring the Germans into a position in Europe of equality. He used all of his charm and persuasive powers at the outset to bring Hallstein⁶ into a close relationship with himself. Hallstein, at that time, was simply a law professor. He had no political base. He had been appointed by Adenauer to be his man on the negotiations.

LT: That was before Hallstein became Under Secretary of State?

SC: That's right. He had held no official position, he was just a Professor of Law. He was appointed as negotiator on the Schuman Plan. It was Monnet who helped develop Hallstein as a political personality and then supported and backed him in the process of

Hallstein's becoming Undersecretary and then the first President of the European Economic Community.

LT: I'm glad you told me that, Stanley. I hadn't realized that Hallstein was in that early.

SC: Oh yes, he was the first appointed negotiator on the German side.

LT: Someone remarked that Monnet was also very lucky. The negotiations took place at a unique time in history when there were three border politicians, Schuman, Adenauer, and de Gasperi ruling in France, Germany and Italy. All three shared two different national cultures and all three knew at first hand the ravages of the First as well as the Second World Wars. They had therefore been tempered by history and were much more malleable, and accepting of change.

SC: I think that's true. Don't forget that all the countries involved had the experience of having lost the war and being occupied. It reminds me of a remark, I believe it was, what was his first name, Carl Philip Ophüls, who was the Hallstein ...

LT: Who?

SC: Ophüls, you know, he was a German who was the juridical representative in the Schuman Plan negotiations, and essentially Hallstein's man. Hallstein had a couple of technical people on his delegation, and Ophüls was the first. He was also a professor of law, like Hallstein, and also a Rhinelander, and so forth. He later was Carstairs' predecessor in charge of regional affairs in the Foreign Office, and ended his career as Ambassador in Brussels.

Ophüls quoted Adenauer as once having said: "I am a Rhinelander by birth and conviction." It was a wonderful phrase. It illustrates the point you were making. In a sense, Schuman too was a Lorrainer by birth and conviction. You're right, but luck is something that you take advantage of. Monnet was the one who seized that opportunity and turned it into concrete action. It was an opportunity which otherwise might have been let go. Indeed, when Schuman became Foreign Minister, he didn't really know what he wanted to do in foreign policy. But clearly he wanted to do something new and different. He needed to distinguish his own position from that of his party colleague and rival Bidault who up until that time had been virtually the permanent Foreign Minister of France since the Liberation. Schuman was casting around for ideas. His Director of Cabinet was Bernard Clappier, a brilliant French financial civil servant (now governor of the Bank of France) who had worked closely with Monnet in an earlier period. (Clappier accomplished a great deal later on as director of external economic relations. Clappier was, perhaps more than any other single person, responsible for reversing French protectionism.) Because he recognized that the European idea was important to his principal objective of opening up French trade policy, Clappier was and has remained a "European." Clappier saw a man with the idea -- Monnet, and a minister in search of an idea -- Schuman. He brought the two together. It was that midwifery which was of crucial importance in making the thing happen.

Let's go back to the negotiations and how they worked.

Monnet would apply the same technique that I've already talked about. There were initially five national delegations. Later they were six. The Dutch only joined near the end of the negotiations. They met occasionally, they had committees, and they drafted papers. There were coal experts, steel experts, juridical experts, and so forth. The real structure of the negotiations, however, was like this. Monnet would gather together the people he wanted (including the Americans and others who were not parties to the negotiations at all). They would thrash through a problem until he had made up his mind what he wanted to do about it. Then he would formulate it on paper. At this point he would sell it, with the assistance of those who had been in the room with him, to the other people. He was no respecter of nationalities. We Americans were not a part of the negotiations officially though we had something to contribute. It was partly because we'd been brought up in a federal system. Thus we had some concept of how it worked. We had had relevant experience with certain types of issues such as anti-trust. We could draw on experience. Also, very importantly, this was the period of U.S. hegemony in Europe. Nothing could really be accomplished without the at least tacit consent of the U.S. government.

LT: It was something that I'm sure Monnet from the very beginning was acutely aware of.

SC: Absolutely. And, you know, he needed Tommy [William Tomlinson] and the Americans as much as the American group needed him, in a sense, perhaps more. He knew that he had to keep the Americans close, and supportive. The only way that he could do this was to

make sure that he took account of their concerns. He knew that Tommy was the man who had the ability to be both imaginative in terms of the substance of the problem and at the same time to know how to package things for the U.S. government. And he knew how to manipulate the U.S. government, because he had done it most effectively in connection with the Marshall Plan. Monnet had watched that process. So he knew that he had in Tommy not only a collaborator, in the intellectual sense, but also somebody who had the confidence of Bruce and McCloy and one who was peculiarly able to manipulate the U.S. bureaucracy.

LT: So once again we are reminded of what has been said by a lot of old friends and colleagues of Monnet's -- that he had an unerring sense of where power lay ...

SC: Absolutely.

LT: And knew exactly how to use it.

SC: Exactly. Along with the kind of method for developing ideas, this was the other key element. He had a sense of where power lay, and he understood very well the realities of power as distinguished from the appearances of power. He knew how to use people, no question.

LT: There's something interesting. The people who allowed themselves to be used by Monnet are almost legion.

SC: I count myself in their number -- proudly.

LT: But their acquiescence was, I suppose, due in part to the fact that Monnet was not using them for his own gain. He was using them for an idea, and this was something that appealed to everyone.

SC: There are two things, certainly. One that he was using us for an idea in which we could believe. The other was that it was exciting. It was exciting because you felt that you were part of making history happen, not just on the surface, but in reality. You were doing something to really change things. To those of us who were not in positions of personal power, like a senior minister, it gave to us a sense of vicarious power to be participating in a process which one knew was going to change history. Monnet furnished that kind of motivation, a combination of idealism and personal fulfillment. He motivated people who would work, as most of us did, for 20 hours a day for him, or with him. And he had the ability to infuse that feeling even into people who really did have power -- giving them the sense that their power was being used for some real purpose. As you say, it was because in all of these things, he, in all of this period, was in pursuit of an historically important objective, which was selfless.

LT: Stanley, we should call an end to this interview. We'll continue at another time.

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Footnotes

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¹David Bruce, Ambassador to France from May 1949 to March 1952.

²Dean Acheson, U.S. Secretary of State from 1949 to 1952.

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³Office of Strategic Services, a wartime U.S. intelligence unit.

⁴Jefferson Caffrey, U.S. Ambassador to France from December 1944 to May 1949.

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⁵Amadeo Peter Giannini, founder of the Bank of America.

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⁶Walter Hallstein.