

Interview with Professor Milton Katz by Leonard B. Tennyson for the Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe at Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, on 28 January 1988.

Leonard Tennyson: We can start anywhere, Professor Katz. I propose that one way would be if you begin by telling me where you first encountered Jean Monnet.

Milton Katz: I think perhaps I could give some structure to this interview first by saying there were really two phases in my work with Monnet and my friendship with him. One was during World War Two when he was a member without portfolio of the British Supply Council in North America -- which I'll define for you in a moment. And the other was during my period as W. Averell Harriman's deputy, and later, as Averell Harriman's successor in running the Marshall Plan in Europe. Thereafter, I saw Jean only intermittently, on an occasional visit to Europe and on his occasional visits here to the United States. The relationship remained warm, personal, and friendly, but it had little continuity. So I think what I have to offer to your collection of data really should focus on those two levels of experience.

LT: Did you meet him through Felix Frankfurter?*

MK: What happened was this. I was with the War Production Board in Washington. I'd gone down in 1939 to work with its predecessor organization. When the War Production Board as such came into being in 1941 I became what was called a solicitor under its general counsel, John Lord O'Brian. An absolutely first-rate group of people constituted its legal division. John Lord O'Brian wanted me to have a title above that of assistant general counsel. So it was he who suggested I be called "solicitor." In addition, I was counsel

*Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court

to Donald Nelson when he was head of the War Production Board's Purchasing Division. That was before he became head of the War Production Board. It was at that point, when President Roosevelt announced contemporaneous reorganization of war production under the aegis of the War Production Board, that I received a phone call from Felix Frankfurter. He said he wanted me to meet a man named Monnet, whom he described (I remember this clearly) as ruthless in thought and analysis. He was, said Frankfurter, eager to meet me and tell me how the War Production Board should be organized. (It was by then widely known I was Nelson's eminence gris. But what do you call an eminence gris when he's very young?)

LT: Eminence sans gris?

MK: Anyway, I was actually his chief adviser. And it was in that capacity that Monnet wanted to talk to me. I went over to Felix's for dinner. Monnet was invited. I guess Jimmy Byrnes* was there, and Owen Roberts.** After dinner, Felix had arranged for Monnet and me to sit to one side, in a corner and chat.

Monnet said to me, 'It is very important that the War Production Board succeed. It is therefore very important that Mr. Nelson succeed. For that it is essential that he understand that he must direct and not administer.'

I said, 'Those are admirable words, Mr. Monnet. What exactly do you mean by them?'

He said, 'I mean that he must keep in mind the larger issues of policy. He must keep in mind the main lines of direction. He must address himself to

*James Byrnes, former U.S. Senator, then head of the Office of War Mobilization in the White House.

**Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.

keeping the institution on the main lines of direction, keeping with the central needs of the nation and the war. He must not get himself bogged down in day-to-day administration or else he'll lose touch with longer term objectives and the larger reality.' This is my rough paraphrase.

LT: It's remarkable that you can recall so much of the essence of Monnet.

MK: He concluded, saying, 'Insofar as you can bring this about, this is what you should do.' That was our first meeting. I was greatly taken with him, I hoped he was taken with me. At any rate, we saw a good deal of one another. And we always talked in Monnet's terms.

LT: Spell that out a little bit more. When you say 'spoke in Monnet's terms' do you mean that by then he had, in a sense, 'educated you' ---

MK: No, I mean in terms of the larger issues.

LT: That's what I meant.

MK: He refused to get lost.

LT: He wouldn't let you digress from the subject?

MK: No, not anybody. He wanted to talk about the main lines of direction.

LT: Did you go out to his place on Foxhall Road?*

MK: No, it started before he got that place. At any rate, at that time the War Production Board, in its relations with the conduct of the war on a combined basis became the American segment of what was called the 'Combined Production and Resources Board.' ^{Nelson} O'Brian was the American member of the Combined Production and Resources Board, Sir Robert Sinclair was the British member ...

*His residence in Washington.

LT: May I interject? What approximately was the date when you met Monnet? What year? What time of the year? Can you nail it down?

MK: 1940? No. The War Production Board, and the designation of O'Brian, was in 1941. That would have been my first meeting. Now, the British Minister of Production was Nelson's opposite number -- first Oliver ^{Lyttleton} Little, very briefly, and then Ralph Sinclair, who was the real continuity. Later we added Howe for the Canadians.

LT: I'm sorry, who was this Canadian?

MK: Howe, the Canadian minister for munitions.* Under each of them was a man called an executive officer. The British executive officer was Thomas Brand. I was the U.S. executive officer of the Combined Production and Resources Board. The British also had a third mission. There were four or five separate missions for separate purposes. For example, Robert Brand was head of the British Food Mission. Then, in the best British manner, they constituted something called the British Supply Council of North America, consisting of the heads of each of these five or six different missions, plus Monnet. So the British Supply Council of North American consisted of the man who represented the Minister of Production, with the American member of the Combined Productions and Resources Board, the British member of the Combined Raw Materials Board, who was the head of the British Raw Materials Mission in North America, the head of the British Food Mission, and so on. Plus Monnet.

LT: Did Monnet ever tell you how he got the job?

*Clarence D. Howe

MK: He was there, and as I recall as a minister without portfolio. He plainly had great influence. Indeed my second important encounter with him came when I was asked to set up offices for the Combined Production Board in the same building as the War Production Board. The offices occupied an entire floor. Yet all I could find for Monnet was an inside office, quite nice, but not as comfortable as the others. I recall bringing him around to show him his office, and starting to apologize that I couldn't give him a better office.

He caught me by the right elbow (he was always touching me on the right elbow) and said, 'My young friend ...' (I was indeed a young friend, I guess I was 33 or some such.) He said: 'You know, I have been engaged in private business in Paris, London, New York, and in Shanghai. I served the French government in World War I, I served it again in World War II, I now have a connection with the British government. And in this experience I've learned that there is no international problem whatever that can compare in difficulty with the allocation of office space.'

LT: Well Said.

MK: He said, 'I ask you, just don't be concerned. I'm very happy here.' I arranged, however, to have his office very close to mine so I could readily see him. I enjoyed him and found him interesting on so many questions. It was shortly after that that he asked me to come out to his house. It was initially for lunch. And I came out and there was this lovely house on Foxhall Road with a lovely garden and serious paintings on the walls.

I said (I don't know whether by this time I was calling him 'Jean,' I

think not): 'M. Monnet, I really marvel at this camp of yours. Here you are, in an exceedingly transient situation, your country has fallen, you don't know what you'll do next, and you're here for a job, the duration of which none of us can forecast. And yet you live this way.'

'Oh,' he said. 'I decided many years ago, that wherever you happen to be, or however brief the tenure may be, always organize your life as if you were going to live there permanently. Because if you don't do that you'll spend your entire life camping. And I don't choose to spend my entire life camping. And I'm now living the way I choose to live, whatever the circumstances.' This was Monnet, vintage Monnet, actually. And we had a wonderful time.

I remember he told me that his daughter* -- I'm sorry her name escapes me for a moment -- who was then perhaps ten or eleven, did very well in her school in Washington. But she regularly failed French. Sylvia ** was justly upset by this. She called upon the headmistress, and said, 'I don't understand. She is a French girl. What do you mean, she always fails French?' The headmistress said, 'I'm frightfully sorry, but she just can't do certain things. She made a proposal to the French teacher, saying, 'I tell you what. Why don't you come to my house when the girl comes home for luncheon.' So she hid the teacher behind a screen. The girl came home. She chatted volubly in French all through lunch. Then she went off. The teacher came out and said, 'I'm absolutely baffled, I don't know what to make of it. In class she can't

*Anna

**Mme. Monnet

speak a word.' It was perfectly clear. The child had become an ardent American, and she was determined not to be anything but an American. Her way of demonstrating this was to be unable to handle the French course.

LT: There's a particular age when that often happens.

MK: If I can jump ahead a bit, I saw Monnet later when he was back in France. He told me: 'You know, Sylvia's been having a terrible time with our daughter. She is very unhappy. She doesn't want to go to school in France. She wants to go back to Washington. Sylvia doesn't know what to do with her. Do you know what I did? I found for her, down in the Loire Valley, an old private school, which had been organized in the style of the British public school.' He went on: 'In that atmosphere, she found it a bit more congenial, more similar to an American school than it was to the ordinary French lycee. I showed it to her, and she agreed to go. So for the time being that's worked out well.' That was Monnet, adjusting himself to an unpleasant reality.

Getting back to Washington: I recall a number of conversations with him. He said, 'You know, how is this war going to be won?' He said, 'Let's face it. It won't be won unless and until you come in. We don't have the manpower to win it without you. We can come up with all these great plans, whereby you supply the weaponry and expect that will be sufficient.'

'But,' he added, 'I know and you know -- I'm telling you if you don't know -- it can't be won without American manpower. So the question now is, how do we organize this plan on the assumption that you will come in? What do we do, and how do we handle it, what's the best thing we can do?'

LT: I've asked this but have never had an adequate response. What sort of a role, if any, did Monnet play in Lend-Lease?

MK: I can't answer that of direct knowledge, I've heard the same stories you've heard. I think the important point is that Monnet developed a series of constant relationships -- on a minor scale he had a good relationship with me, and on a larger scale he had his relationship with Felix. And he had an unerring instinct for key people. He worked on relationships with key people.

LT: Did that include Harry Hopkins?

MK: It might or it might not.

LT: I haven't had a clear answer from anyone to that either.

MK: As I say, I'd like to confine myself to things that I know.

LT: Please.

MK: I simply don't know, what his relationship was with Harry Hopkins. I did sit with the combined Chiefs of Staff, as a representative of the Production component, branching out from the Combined Resources Board. But I sat there as an observer. Hopkins as you know was the key figure there. He really acted as the chairman. I never saw Monnet there. It happens that Hopkins had some of Monnet's qualities. He too liked to deal with key people and he dealt with people on their merits. He never worried about their age, or position. He was concerned with their having something to deliver. That, Monnet did. It's possible they may have met. If he did he must have appreciated Monnet immensely.

Another important thing about Monnet, was that he relied, for his influence, entirely on the merits of what he had to offer. He never played

fancy games -- not that he wouldn't have been good at them if he had done so. He would say, 'This isn't my cup of tea, my cup of tea is to be as decisive as I can about thinking straight.' He took it for granted that most people couldn't think straight. Thus the people who could had a large advantage. Then too, he was securely fixed with the idea that what he was doing was terribly important. To a degree, he shared what I would call the typical psychology of the Englishman and the American. He had that kind of consciousness.

LT: True.

MK: Indeed, I recall the head of one of France's top enterprises saying to me, 'M. Monnet, ah oui, il va tres bien avec des Anglo-Saxons.' It was a mot juste. He was saying, this fellow can use these Anglo-Saxons better than I.'

LT: Did he ever importune you in any way to go meet Nelson? Or did he figure that having you as a friend was quite enough?

MK: I think that's correct. I think Jean, if he had had one meeting with Nelson would have concluded, 'This is not my guy.' He would have assumed (I think I can say so without immodesty) correctly that if he got me thinking along certain lines I would have no difficulty getting Nelson to think along those lines.

LT: He knew that?

MK: Yes. He knew what was going on in the armed forces. He was greatly troubled by General Somervell.* Here's a very important thing. Somervell,

* Lieutenant-General Brehon B. Somervell; General George C. Marshal's staff officer for supplies serving as Head of Army Service Forces.

who represented General Marshall and all of his counterparts, publicly insisted that priority in the distribution of American weaponry and production allotment should be governed by the needs of the American armed forces. And there was a widespread view on the civilian side that that was the wrong priority, the first priority ought to be Lend-Lease, and keeping the British and the Chinese and the others armed.

I recall one conversation with Monnet in which he said to me, 'You know,' he said, 'Let's face it. If this war is going to be won it will only be won by American military manpower. If and when you come into the war your manpower has to be as ready as it can possibly be.' He said, 'I am not sure but that Somervell might be right and that we have to make sure that the weapons go to the building up of the American armed forces on whom eventually the burden of winning this war is going to have to devolve.'

LT: But then, did he not at that time also say that the estimates that the military was giving for industrial production were far less than needed? I recall hearing from a number of sources that Monnet pounded the table and said, 'Mon Dieu, we have to triple, perhaps quadruple, the figures that your General So-and-so says you need for tanks, for planes, and so on and so forth.'

MK: That is what he said to me. Of course when Roosevelt came out with the plan for fifty thousand planes, ten thousand tanks and so on, he was really trying to get everyone to support accelerated war production efforts. That eventually happened. This was a problem I had had in my own relationships with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I kept saying, I want estimates from the

people who are fighting the war, I don't want it from your supply people.

LT: And ... ?

MK: The relationship with the supply people simply wasn't satisfactory to me. A supply man thought in terms of what he believed would happen, all of his calculations of need were based on what he saw in front of him. What I wanted was someone to start from the strategic needs of the war. Then I could help him translate that into requirements. That, I assume, would have been Monnet's way of thinking too. As I say I prefer to confine my remarks to you to what I know and not what I heard people think he said.

I recall Nelson calling me in one day, and handing me a letter from Hopkins to him, transmitting a plan which Hopkins had been handed by Somervell, the gist of which would have been to turn over to Somervell and his naval counterparts primary responsibility for calculating production requirements. I remember Nelson saying to me, 'This looks all right to me, doesn't it?' And I said, 'It may look all right to you, darn it, it's absolutely stark raving mad. I'm going to write a reply pronto for you to sign.'

I wrote a reply that said, 'This confuses the procurement process with the strategic direction of the war. The determination of where the United States of America is going can be made only by the President of the United States and such political advice as he chooses to take. The determination of strategic direction of the war, under the President's primary direction, can only be made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The translation of strategic requirements into weapons requirements is a function of the people who have to fight the war, not the supply people. The translation of weapons

requirements into production is the function of the people who understand the production system, and not the function of army supply officers. And the theory of the War Production Board is that it is made up of those with a long understanding of the American production system. This has to be clear. This is the only way the process can be organized.' Nelson was alarmed by the letter but I said, 'Sign it, damn it, and send it to Hopkins as soon as you've signed it.' He did. Hopkins accepted it.

LT: That was succinct.

MK: It just turned everything around. Hopkins was a very clear thinker. Now if I can jump ahead to phase two. I went to Europe in June of '48, initially as Averell Harriman's general counsel. I became his deputy, and then I became his successor.

LT: Did you succeed him in '51?

MK: No, no. I suppose just beyond I became his deputy, and largely I was running the whole operation. And he even used to say, 'Well, Katz runs everything, Averell has nothing left to do.' Well, that was not so. Averell was terribly important, but he simply moved away from the running of the organization, to the inter-relationships between the different aspects of the European recovery. And of course he became increasingly interested in NATO and the military side of things.

LT: Did you have much to do with David Bruce, and 'Tommy' (William) Tomlinson?

MK: Well, Bruce, you see, was head of the U.S. Marshall Plan mission to France, and Bruce reported to me.

LT: That's right, he had that job first, before he became Ambassador.

MK: That's right.

LT: I'd forgotten that.

MK: Tommy Tomlinson was his chief person there. And Tommy was quite an operator. I think that on balance he was a very useful person indeed. He was a free-wheeler, and he always liked to do a great many things that may or may not have made much difference. None of that troubled me, though. I had so much to deal with I didn't know where to start. Tommy set up his own relations with Monnet. I took it for granted that Jean would never miss an opportunity to have a relationship with anybody who was useful or influential. In that period I used to see Monnet quite frequently, but never on any specific subjects. I liked my talks with him. I had a work day which ran a very long time. I was constantly concerned with not getting bogged down in what Monnet would have called 'administration.' He was dead right about keeping oneself free.

LT: I hope you were less harassed in those days than Harriman appeared. When I would encounter him in Paris he always looked as though he was ready to drop dead from exhaustion.

MK: Now let me tell you about an incident which was marvelous. When Monnet proposed the Coal & Steel Community, we, in the Marshall Plan, were very much for it. So was Jack McCloy, who was then the High Commissioner in Germany. The British government didn't want any part of it. They were very suspicious. It was about the same time that we were working on what actually became the European Payment Union. I was having difficulties with the British over that. They were resisting it. Acheson* was also very dubious about the European Coal & Steel Community. In fact he joined the British in thinking their way. Then there was a meeting in London. Monnet was there.

*Dean Acheson, U.S. Secretary of State

LT: Any notion of the date?

MK: It was in 1950, and the President was trying to reach a conclusion about whether he would support the European Coal & Steel Community, resist it, or be negative about it.

LT: And that was soon after the announcement.

MK: That's right. Hoffmann* was leaning with us, that is to say with McCloy and with me. Acheson was leaning the other way. And we had a meeting in London on the European payments business. The British government designated Gaitskell** and the U.S. government designated me to work out a final settlement on that and a number of related issues. And by the same time negotiations were going on relating to the American attitude towards the Coal & Steel Community. At one point during that time, I dined alone with Monnet. I said to him, 'Jean you have this European Coal & Steel Community on your mind. The question is being raised about British participation. You have other things on your mind (which eventually emerged, as the European Defense Community) and so on. I'm familiar with all the economic arguments involved in this. That's not what's ultimately motivating you. You're being motivated by something else. What is it?'

And he said, 'I'll tell you what it is. France was overrun by the Germans. Then it was overrun by you.' He pointed at me. 'You're nice people, and you're helping us out, but the fact of the matter is you're running this place -- we aren't. The Germans are overrun by you and by the Russians. What is the source of a Frenchman's attachment to France and a German's attachment to Germany? It's a combination of security and honor, you see. Well, how can

*Paul Hoffman, Head of the European Reconstruction Program (ERP) popularly known as the Marshall Plan.

**Hugh Gaitskell, Britain's Chancellor of the Exchequer.

any Frenchman feel a sense of security seriously, or an attachment to France, after it's been overrun by everybody? How can a German feel a sense of security and attachment to Germany when it's been overrun by everybody? We need to have a larger unit. And it must be a unit that's ours, and one that you're not in. Anything that you're in, you're running. We need to have a unit that's ours.'

LT: Nice.

MK: 'You see,' he said, 'it has to be a unit large enough so that we can believe that it can work, so that it can have strength, so it has enough strength, so that it gives the sense of security we used to get from our identification with our country. But it must be small enough so that it's ours, and nobody else's. That's why we have to have a Franco-German unit. But I can't have a only Franco-German unit. So I've put it in a slightly larger context.'

'Well then,' I said, 'In that event British participation is a problem for you, isn't it?'

'Well,' he said, 'we have to invite them in, but they won't go.'

I said, 'Are you sure?' He said, 'Look. The British won't go any farther into Europe that you'll go behind them. If you're here they'll go here, if you're there they'll go there, but they're not going to go any further.'

'Well,' I said, 'let me ask you this question, Jean. Put it in your terms. I suppose the most intense, the deepest, psychological and emotional experience of any Englishman in the last generation was Dunkirk. At Dunkirk one half of Europe was trying to break his head in. That was the German

half. The other half of Europe was collapsing over him. That was the French half. Why should any Englishman feel in the pit of his belly that he wants to be identified with a combination of the two? I'm talking now of human realities, Jean, I'm not talking about economical arguments or all this sophisticated stuff that people put together. I'm talking about the same realities that you're talking about when you say why you want to have a Franco-German unit.'

He said, 'You're right, and that's why the British will never come in. They won't come in any further than you have. They won't let the distance between them and you extend beyond a certain amount.' It was really a wonderful conversation.

LT: Did he tell you about his visit to London with Etienne Hirsch after the Schuman Plan announcement? They both went over to talk to the government about joining in the Schuman Plan. They got a very cold shoulder from Atlee and others.

MK: No, he did not relate it at that time.

LT: He didn't let it embitter him in any way. He just said, well that's a fact of life.

MK: That's because Monnet didn't waste time.

LT: He hadn't a trace of sentimentality.

MK: No, none of that nonsense, he was factually oriented. Well, as you know the President decided to support it, President Truman.

LT: Did you have people from the business or the political side in the U.S. importuning you against lending support to the Schuman Plan?

MK: I can't dredge up any specific recollections to that effect. I had a problem, because the Treasury was very much opposed to the European payments union.

LT: What were their grounds?

MK: That it was a European pattern contrary to the whole concept which had come out of the 1944 meetings.

LT: Bretton Woods?

MK: It was contrary to the whole Bretton Woods philosophy and they wanted the Bretton Woods pattern which had emerged to remain dominant.

LT: A very British point of view.

MK: Let me see, I want to bring this into focus. You see they said it was contrary to the international bankers' instructions (the International Monetary Fund) and the whole Bretton Woods pattern. They felt that I was fostering a regional entity which would break away from the world entity. There was in Washington a group called the Advisory Committee on Monetary Affairs dominated by the Treasury. Its members tried hard to torpedo the European Payments Union. This happened just about at the point when I'd brought the British into the picture and was just breaking down the last-minute resistance from the Dutch and the Swiss. In relation to the British as I told you, I had some extensive negotiations with Gaitskell. After the British finally came along, Gaitskell joined me in trying to deal with problems raised by the Dutch and the Swiss. About this time the Treasury began trying to side-track these efforts by invoking support of the Advisory Committee and by bringing in the whole Bretton Woods group -- and all of that.

Hoffman called me in some alarm, and said, 'Where are we, and what do we do?' I said to him, 'Paul, look. The final decision on this is in all practical senses yours. Nobody else can make the decision. The Treasury people if they're successful could get President Truman to order you to take a different position. At that point if you wished you could tell him you won't take a different position; if he wishes you to resign you could resign and he could accept your resignation. So the realistic position is in your hands. In my considered judgment we should go through with this. In my considered judgment all this torpedoing, stories being planted in the Times, and all their other manuevers can't stop me. Only one person can stop me. That's you. And as I've just explained, in theory the President can stop you but realistically no one can stop you. So what you have to decide, and authorize me to go and play this out the way I want to play it out.' And Paul said, 'That's a larger order, can you give me twenty-four hours?' And I said, 'Yes, why don't you call me in twenty-four hours and say OK.' And he called me, and said, 'Okay, go ahead, we'll stand firm on this.'

It's hard for me to sort out whether this same group of people opposed to the EPU were attacking the Coal & Steel Community outline as well. They seemed opposed to it for much the same reasons and on much the same basis.

Linc (Lincoln) Gordon, who was one of my two chief economic advisors, badgered me every day, saying this was a wrong step economically. I said, 'Linc, I don't give a damn if it's the wrong step economically, there are far more important things involved here, deeper psychological human factors, which is infinitely more important. And that's why I'm supporting it.'

LT: Linc shared the British view of the ECSC.

MK: Maybe yes, he tended to drift that way. But I am specifically unable to recall whether the Treasury at this time was also attacking me on the European Coal & Steel Community.

LT: Was the Payments Union the brainchild of any one particular person?

MK: I don't think so. In my group I had Henry Taska, my Treasury representative. He was very much for it. There were other key people. (What was the name of that young Belgian who worked for us? He was an American by then, but still Belgian in his thinking.) The name will come to me in a minute. He was a very key fellow. I would say that it was born out of interactions between six or eight people of varying nationalities in the OEEC -- Europeans and Americans.

LT: I personally thought it was the brightest star in the history of the OEEC.

MK: I think it was.

LT: Did you ever see the Marshall Plan and the Coal & Steel Community coming together to make common cause in any way?

MK: Well you see, I came home in December of '51, so I didn't follow the details of the subsequent developments. What was that Belgian chap's name?

LT: Was he a politician?

MK: No, he's in university, he's written a number of books. It's a well-known name.

LT: You're talking about Triffin, Robert Triffin?

MK: Bob Triffin of course!

LT; You know, I'm sure, that Robert Triffin became an invaluable

adviser to Monnet in the Action Committee for a United Europe.

MK: Oh yes.

LT: They got on like a house afire.

MK: Certainly, absolutely brilliant, you know, a brilliant man.

LT: He wrote a lovely book in the early '50's, called Europe's Money Muddle.

MK: Yes, I have it, I've read it.

LT: Something that has attracted people to Monnet has been the way that Monnet dealt with problems of scale in the international monetary, economic, and political spheres. He seemed to be able to define problems in real terms and come up with institutional frameworks wherein a solution became possible. Is there something we can learn from what Monnet accomplished when we try to seize upon other seemingly insoluble problems, whether they arise out of the mess in Latin America, or elsewhere? Monnet, after all, was concerned with institutional structures which could override the short-term interests of nations or individuals. And he was also rather ruthless in suggesting that institutions had to be renewed, modified, or replaced. Other people say, perhaps with justification, yes, but Monnet happened to be a unique fellow. You can't take the uniqueness of this man and generalize it into something that will be pragmatic and useful.

MK: Well, I don't know what I can contribute to that. Again, I'm trying to confine myself to things that I know and not go off into speculation. Monnet, as I say, never relied on artifice, artificial maneuvering, or bamboozling. He relied on the clarity and force of his thoughts, and on

his capacity to pick out essentials and deal with essentials. He relied on the persuasiveness of facts -- the facts were carefully sorted out and presented in a meaningful way. He really had a remarkable clarity, and the clarity was based on perspective. It was really remarkable the way he could separate the important from the unimportant. So that his thought really represented a singularly distant mind in which the outstanding qualities were the capacity to focus on essentials and the capacity to think clearly.

Well, let me tell you one little incident which I think is very revealing. Monnet and I were talking about an individual. At one point he asked me if the person was ambitious. I burst out laughing. He happened to be an important and highly-placed person. I said, 'But Jean, of course he's ambitious. Aren't all of us ambitious? What do you mean by that?' He replied, 'Well, I meant something else. Is he ambitious to be, or ambitious to do?'

LT: It's one of the famous questions Monnet used to put to people.

MK: Now Monnet was almost exclusively ambitious to do. And that helped the clarity of his thinking. He didn't get himself cluttered up by the subconscious question of where does this lead me. That enabled him to deal with the problem, and not what does it do for Monnet. And he also recognized, and made it explicit to me, that people were perfectly willing to let him take over and run things in fact, provided he never allowed himself to wear the trappings of importance, of office and of power.

LT: He once said, 'You know, I've never asked for a job that I didn't get.' That's much the same thing that you said.

MK: That's right. And he always allowed other people to have all the glory, all the newspaper publicity, and everything else. He said, 'That's where you get rivalry, that's what they care about. The fact that you're really doing the work doesn't interest them a bit. So long as you never take the credit and you never ask for the conspicuous position, and the invitations to the large affairs, and all the rest of it.' So he stayed out of all of that, and did it successfully. He said, 'I must stay out of it, I don't want to provoke irritation and a sense of competitiveness about trivialities, so long as they let me do the work.' And kibitzers are always willing to let you do the work, they don't want to do that, it's hard. They don't want to be bothered with it.

LT: This has been a very useful talk. Thank you very much.

MK: You're welcome.

Henry L. Stimson Professor of Law and Director, International Legal Studies, Emeritus, Harvard Law School. Distinguished Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School.

A.B. Harvard (1927); J.D. Harvard (1931); LL.D. Brandeis University. Member of an anthropological expedition to Central Africa for the Peabody Museum, Harvard, 1927-28. Member of the New York Bar and the Massachusetts Bar.

Career has followed three main channels: law; foreign affairs; and civic and educational activities.

LAW

- Currently: Distinguished Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School.
- 1954-1978: Henry L. Stimson Professor of Law and Director, International Legal Studies, Harvard Law School.
- 1948-1949: General Counsel, European Headquarters, Economic Cooperation Administration (Marshall Plan).
- 1946-1948: Byrne Professor of Administrative Law, Harvard Law School.
- 1941-1943: Solicitor, War Production Board.
- 1940-1941: Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
- 1939-1940: Lecturer in Law, Harvard Law School.
- 1932-1939: Attorney, Reconstruction Finance Corporation; Executive Assistant to the Chairman, Securities & Exchange Commission; Special Assistant to the U.S. Attorney General (Antitrust Division).
- 1931-1932: Law Clerk to U.S. Circuit Judge Julian W. Mack.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

- 1942-1943: U.S. Executive Officer, Combined Production and Resources Board (United States-United Kingdom-Canada).
- 1944-1946: Lieutenant Commander, USNR, assigned to Secret Intelligence Branch, Office of Strategic Services, Mediterranean and European theatres. Thereafter, Deputy Chief of Secret Intelligence, OSS Headquarters, Washington.

- 1946: Appointed by the Secretary of the Navy to a group under the direction of Ferd Eberstadt to examine possible unification of the War and Navy Departments and post-war organization for national security.
- 1949-1950: Deputy United States Special Representative in Europe (Marshall Plan), with rank of Ambassador.
- 1950-1951: U.S. Special Representative in Europe, with rank of Ambassador, serving as Chief of the Marshall Plan in Europe. Concurrently, Chairman of the Financial and Economic Committee of NATO; U.S. Representative to the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.
- 1951-1954: Vice President, Ford Foundation, in charge of programs relating to international affairs.
- 1954-1978: (Concurrently with primary duties at Harvard Law School) Member, Faculty Committee for the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University; Faculty Associate, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University; Chairman, Committee on Plans and Programs, Harvard University Institute for International Development.
- 1956-1958: Chairman, Panel on Foreign Economic Policy, Rockefeller Brothers Fund Special Study Project.
- 1961: Survey of university training in law, political science, and economics in Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Argentina, and Brazil for the Committee on Higher Education in the American Republics.
- 1961-1962: Member, Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel, constituted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace at the request of the Secretary of State.
- 1965: Chairman, Committee on Manpower, White House Conference on International Cooperation.
- 1970-1978: Chairman, Board of Trustees, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Trustee, 1954-78.

- 1970-1978: Chairman, Board of Trustees, International Legal Center.
- 1954 to date: Trustee and Member of the Executive Committee, World Peace Foundation.
- 1981-1983: Member, Steering Group, European Security Study.

CIVIC AND EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITIES

- 1954-to date: Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences. President, 1979-82.
- 1964-to date: Trustee, Brandeis University
- 1975-to date: Member, Committee on Technology and International Economic and Trade Issues, National Academy of Engineering.
- 1974-1985: Member, Advisory Board of M.I.T.'s Energy Laboratory.
- 1977-78: National Phi Beta Kappa Distinguished Visiting Scholar.
- 1972-1982: Consultant, U.S. Office of Technology Assessment and Chairman of that Office's Advisory Committee on Energy.
- 1978-1982: Co-chairman, National Conference Group of Scientists and Lawyers, constituted by the American Bar Association and the American Association for the Advancement of Science.
- 1968-1982: Trustee, Case Western Reserve University.
- 1966-1968: Member of a Study Committee appointed jointly by Case Institute of Technology and Western Reserve University whose report was followed by a federation of the two universities into Case Western Reserve University.
- 1971-1972: President, Alpha Chapter, Phi Beta Kappa, Harvard University.
- 1957-1978: Assisted William H. Vanderbilt in establishing the Citizens' Research Foundation. Served as Director, 1957-1978 and as President, 1969-1978.
- 1968-1975: Chairman, Committee on the Life Sciences and Social Policy, National Academy of Sciences.

LAW

Books

Federal Regulation of Campaign Finance: Some Constitutional Questions (Milton Katz, Ed.) (Citizens' Research Foundation Monograph No. 18 (1972) (monograph)).

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No. 5, p. 22 (February 1981).

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Bulletin, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, vol. XXXIV,
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Bulletin, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, vol. XXXIV,
No. 8, p. 33 (May 1981).

Introductory Remarks to a Communication by Rosalyn S. Yalow,
Bulletin, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, vol. XXXV,
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77 countries, under a covering memorandum dated May 15, 1954.