

Interview with John Tuthill, for the Jean Monnet Foundation, Lausanne.
April 15, 1981 in Washington, DC.

Leonard Tennyson: Tell me, John, when was the first time you came across Jean Monnet? When did you meet him?

John Tuthill: I have difficulty putting a precise date on it. It was when I was Economic Minister at the Embassy in Paris. It was before DeGaulle came back.

LT: It was just about that time, I didn't realize you were there that early.

JT: So that it was in the fall of '57. I must have met him before, surely. But the first time I had any serious dealings with him had to do with the economic assistance package which we were putting together for France at the end of '57. It's curious to think back, that at the end of '57, we still had to have an aid program to France, which came to about 600 million dollars. Monnet was brought in by the French government. He had returned to 83 Avenue Foch. He was President of the Action Committee for the United States of Europe, but typically enough, he was brought in by the French government. It was the Socialist government of Guy Mollét.

LT: It was Maunoury, the short-lived [Maurice] Bourges-Maunoury government. I remember he [Monnet] came over with Pierre-Paul Schweitzer, who was then in the Treasury.¹

JT: Pierre-Paul Schweitzer was Director-General of the Treasury, that's right. Monnet became the key man in that negotiation in Paris, key man as an eminence gris -- that sort of thing.

LT: You talked with him and gave him some advice before he actually went on that mission?

JT: Well, in the first place, we put the package pretty much together when I was in Paris, and it was a package which included all sorts of things. Aid packages frequently are designed to increase the total amount, because a substantial psychological effect was desired.

I remember, after we put it together, I sent a cable to Washington, outlining the various "aid" areas which we thought we would bring the total to 6 or 7 hundred million dollars. I brought Monnet a copy of the cable I had sent in. Monnet thought the cable was fine, but then he looked at the distribution of it, in Washington, and he was appalled. He said, "Oh my God, what do all these initials mean? Did all those people see this message? Do they all know that I thought such and such?" And I told him, "That's right." And he was, to put it mildly, upset.

LT: Did he at that time attempt to tell you, or perhaps you can explain a way why he had suddenly taken off one hat and put on another? that is, that of being a French national, and getting away from wearing that particular chapeau of the European.

JT: No, I don't think he ever bothered. You know, like lots of things with Monnet, some things were explained in greatest detail, and other things were left completely unexplained. He just treated it as entirely natural, that the French Government, and it was a Socialist [sic] government that he was well disposed toward, that when they were in trouble that he would take on the activities of, really, a French negotiator.

LT: I would guess, that one of the reasons Bourges-Maunoury came to him was that he knew he had excellent relations with the U.S. [Eisenhower] administration of that time. (I've forgotten whether Dulles was still alive?)

JT: Oh, yes.

LT: And certainly Eisenhower was, and I suspect that might have had a part, I'm not sure.

JT: Well, I'm sure it had a big part, that Monnet had a very close relationship with both Eisenhower and Dulles. But it was Guy Mollet.

LT: No, it was not Mollet, it was Bourges-Maunoury. And so that set you on the path to getting to know Monnet better. You found other occasions to deal with him, even when you were in that Embassy job?

JT: Yes, well, I think the main reason that, the main substantive basis for further talk with Monnet, was the conviction that I was developing, that the old OEEC was no longer appropriate, with its emphasis entirely upon, really, a European free trade area type of emphasis, with no Canadian or American membership.

I came back to Washington at the end of '59. During that period I was becoming more and more convinced that we had to change the OEEC very basically, and establish, create a new organization, with different objectives, and with Canadian and American, and ultimately Japanese, Australian, and New Zealand participation.

I think the thing that probably brought us together, more than anything else, was that in '58 we both opposed the efforts of the British and neutral countries to organize a European free trade area,

which fitted right into the pattern of the OEEC work. And I don't think that Monnet was probably wildly enthusiastic about the OECD, but he felt it was a way -- and he was right -- to break the momentum towards a European free trade area.

The agreement to go forward on the OECD was reached at a quadripartite meeting in Paris in December 1959, and it was Eisenhower, DeGaulle, Adenauer, and I guess Macmillan ... was it Macmillan?

LT: I think it was Macmillan -- he was still in office at the time.

JT: And of course they were meeting about global problems. Dillon² was Undersecretary of State. He agreed to slip in a paper indicating that the OEEC should give way to a new organization with different objectives. Surely Monnet supported that. He helped us to a certain extent during the negotiations. He was for a new organization with the Americans and Canadians and the others in, but with an emphasis toward getting the then-six countries of the Common Market operating as a unit within the organization -- an objective which, incidentally, we never achieved, because of the failure of the Six to have a delegation in Paris which was capable of speaking for the Six.

What really brought Monnet and me together was that we both were opposed to the European-wide Free Trade area and this [the OECD] was a very useful instrument to stop that momentum.

LT: Did he actually offer any substantive ideas about the kind of organization he'd like to see the OECD become?

JT: Very little, really. His interest was basically negative, to stop the European Free Trade Area. He was occasionally helpful, because if things were slow with the French Government he would

quietly call somebody. And I remember when we conducted the negotiations I mentioned to François Valery who was active on the French scene -- the French delegation with Clappier³ and Jean François Poncet -- in creating the framework. Valery was the representative at the Chateau de la Muette. And I mentioned the fact that there was ...

LT: What Valery was that?

JT: François Valery, the son of the well-known Valery. And I mentioned that it would be a good idea if we had some publicity about what we were doing. And Valery said, "Oh my God, no publicity. DeGaulle doesn't have the faintest idea what we're doing and if he reads about it in the paper he'll certainly be opposed to it, so let's not have it."

Monnet's interest (as was so often the case, he had certain relatively simple objectives) during that time was to break the momentum of the European Free Trade Area. When we created the OECD, of course the emphasis was on coordination of economic and financial policy, and he didn't really care very much about that. He did care about creation of the Development Assistance Committee, and some peripheral work on trade.

After we created it and got it going, Jimmy Riddleberger⁴ was the first chairman of the Development Assistance Committee. One day Monnet came to me -- he was relaxed then, because the momentum was broken on the European Free Trade Area, and so he was a little more philosophical about things. He had heard that Riddleberger wasn't very vigorous as chairman of the Development Assistance Committee. He said to me, "How are things going at the Chateau de la Muette, especially with the Development Assistance Committee?"

And I said, "Oh, very well." And he said, "Are there any arguments or battles?" And I said, "No, no, things are going very smoothly." He said, "If you don't have any battles you're not making any progress, it means you're not doing anything." He was absolutely right, because the Development Assistance Committee was sort of like an old gossip circle, they would talk about each other's aid programs. We all had splendid statements of objectives, and we weren't achieving the purpose at all of increasing and improving the flow of aid.

LT: And yet as I recall the DAC was precisely one of those aspects of the OECD for which people held out the most promise.

JT: That's right. The two things that really interested those of the negotiators on the American side was the coordination of economic and financial policy, which really didn't interest Monnet very much, and the aid to developing countries.

LT: And then what happened? But let me -- this is a little bit of an aside, I suppose. Did you ever work with, or did you ever know, Tommy Tomlinson, who had essentially your job, much earlier in Paris?

JT: Well I knew him, but not terribly well. And I must confess, when I was in Bonn, working under Dr. Conant who was the American Ambassador, at the time of the negotiations for the European Defense Community, we used to have meetings of our Embassies in Europe. Tommy Tomlinson was always there, and quite frankly I thought that Tommy's description of the Europe that he favored was really, terribly naive. I was very skeptical.

I was not skeptical about the start of the Coal and Steel Community. I remember we met in Paris, one of those meetings when this was first announced, and most people from Washington thought, well, this is just going to be a coal-steel cartel and a bad thing. I did not agree with that. But then, later on, when the Defense Community was being negotiated, and Tommy used to sound off at these meetings, I was very skeptical really about that.

LT: I remember him early on when I was working for the Marshall Plan, I remember him slightly at one or two meetings. I recall him as always being very well briefed, and rather didactic.

JT: Yes, that's right. Well, he, I know he was just terribly close to Monnet. Monnet just thought the world of him.

LT: He did, indeed.

JT: And as you probably know, in his apartment on the Avenue Foch, one of the pictures shows Monnet with Tommy, Monnet with his arm around his shoulders as I recall.

LT: You remember the other picture on the wall?

JT: The painting?

LT: No, the Thor Heyerdal photograph. He was a great admirer of the Norwegian explorer, Thor Heyerdal.

JT: Oh, that's right of course, Kon-Tiki, yes. But there's also the painting, you know, the painting by Sylvia.

LT: Yes, the painting, that's still hanging by the sofa. Splendid painting, too.

Well, when did you start -- this is a question I suppose I have to ask you -- when did you start characterizing Monnet and how

did you come to characterize him, was there anything that emerged as you came to know the man better?

JT: Well, maybe I could give a little more background as to when I started to see a good deal of him, because in '57-58 it was fairly limited, and I was at the American Embassy then. I went back to Washington in '59. As I mentioned, in December '59 we got the go-ahead of the four heads of government to create what became the OECD, and I came back. Randy Burgess⁵ was made the head of the U.S. wise men's group and I was his deputy.

So I came back to Paris, really for the year, off and on. January of '59 through the end of that year, no, January of '60 through the end of '60. During those negotiations, and at that time I got to see quite a bit of him, because he did have still this very limited but clear interest in the OECD.

Then after the Kennedy election in November of 1960, George Ball⁶ asked me whether I wanted to come into his office (he was then named Undersecretary for Economic Affairs) as special assistant to him, or become the first American Ambassador to the OECD. It took me about one-tenth of a second to say, "I'll take the OECD job." Now that job brought me physically very close to Monnet, because we took the office on the corner of rue de Faisandre and Avenue Foch.

LT: I remember it well.

JT: Right next to 83 Avenue Foch. So I was located there for over two years before I went to Brussels to the European Community, within 20 or 30 yards of Monnet's office.

LT: You were replaced by Coffin, as I recall.

JT: No, Coffin was part of my delegation, heading up the DAC work.

LT: Oh, that's right.

JT: I was replaced by John Leddy. John came over to tell me that Ball wanted me to go to Brussels to replace Butterworth. I said, "Well, John, you must tell me, who's going to replace me here, because I've worked a long time on this OECD," and he said, "Well, I have to tell you that I'm going to replace you." He said, "Quite frankly, if I had by choice between Brussels and Paris, I'd take Brussels. But George wants you to go to Brussels, and I'll take the Paris job."

So there was a transition from Paris to Brussels. While that took me physically away from where Monnet was located, it brought me increasingly, substantively, into what Monnet was doing.

Also there was that exposure to Monnet in that immediate post-election period in 1960, when George Ball called me before the new Administration had come in and said that Vice-President-elect Johnson and Senator Fulbright⁷ were coming to Paris. By that time I knew Monnet quite well, and George said, "Would you try to get an appointment for them to see Monnet?"

George was forever sending people from the United States over to see Monnet to get educated. So I went to the Inter-Continental Hotel to pick up Fulbright and Johnson, and when I finally got them out of the hotel, which was not easy, we drove to Monnet's apartment.

Johnson pulled out a letter -- I now know it was a letter from

Phil Graham.⁸ He read this letter to Fulbright and me. It said, "What is a Texas cowboy like you doing talking to a French philosopher like Monnet?"

I said, "Well, I don't know who wrote that letter, but whoever it is doesn't know what he's talking about. This is not a French philosopher, this is a French peasant, with all the strength and all the earthiness of a French peasant. He's shrewd, but don't talk philosophy with Monnet. He has certain clear objectives, but he certainly wouldn't fall into the category of an intellectual or a philosopher."

It was a funny meeting, actually, because those two Americans came in, and Monnet, in an effort to put them at their ease, said that he had just read a report by doctors in the United States as to how it is that some people get old, and they're lively, and happy, and healthy, and everything, and the doctors examined them and asked them about their history, you know, whether they drank or didn't drink, or smoked or didn't smoke, chased women or didn't chase women, and they couldn't find anything in common with them except for one thing. It was that none of them worried. And then he looked at Fulbright and Johnson who were two of the greatest worriers in the United States.

During the meeting I don't know whether Johnson was asleep or not. His eyes were closed and his head was more or less on his chest. This went on for about an hour and then he kind of pulled himself together and said, "Oh my God, I have a press conference." Fulbright stayed on. I went on down to the car with Johnson. Be-

fore Johnson got in the car, he said, "Now I've seen DeGaulle, and I've seen Monnet, what'll I tell the press?" I said, "Well, you can't attack DeGaulle, because you're here as a Vice-President-elect, but why don't you just concentrate on the merits of Monnet? That is, concentrate on the merits of European unity, which is not DeGaulle's favorite subject, and the need to -- share sovereignty." Johnson proceeded to do it -- not that it made much difference.

I think it was about that stage that I started to develop more understanding of Monnet, and Monnet's single minded horror of sovereignty -- of excessive sovereignty. Time and again he mentioned that this was one of the main evils of our age.

LT: Did he go back to World War I, the aftermath of that, in talking about it?

JT: Not really. I'm sure it affected his approach to it, you know, and his own experience with the League of Nations, but frequently he got back to this theme of that one of the main problems in dealing with the world are those nations that cling to sovereignty. Which is really the basis of his disagreement with DeGaulle.

LT: Yes.

JT: There was another funny story, about Monnet and DeGaulle which unfortunately occurred after the assassination of Kennedy. They all came back, you know, after the funeral to a reception on the eighth floor of the State Department. All these heads of government, heads of state were there, including people from the Coal and Steel Community, and the European Common Market and Euratom.

LT: I was there.

JT: You were there? you remember, then, the entry of DeGaulle. He waited till just the right moment, and Jean Rey was there from the Commission, and the other Belgian who was at the Coal and Steel Community was there, you know him very well.

LT: Finet?

JT: No, no, not him, the guy who came back from Luxembourg, to --

LT: Coppé.

JT: That's right. Well, in any event, DeGaulle came in. Monnet was talking to Coppé and Rey and myself and one or two other people, and maybe Tennyson, maybe you were a part of that little crowd. In any event, somehow they maneuvered Monnet to DeGaulle, and then everybody politely moved back. Monnet and DeGaulle talked for about, oh, five minutes, which was quite something in a party like that.

Coppé could barely restrain himself from finding out what they were talking about. As soon as it was over Coppé elbowed his way to Monnet to ask him about it. Afterwards Coppé came back to me and he said, "I asked him, 'what did you talk about?' He said, 'We didn't talk about anything. We never talk about anything important when we're together.'"

I think another thing about Monnet and his relationship to DeGaulle, DeGaulle certainly knew that a fair amount of the financial help that came to the United States -- the Action Committee for the United States of Europe -- came from organizations such as the Ford Foundation, Shep Stone, Joe Slater, and all those people. The point of view of DeGaulle was that the Action Committee was almost a subversive organization. And Monnet, in his apartment at 83 Avenue Foch

used to talk about all these things quite openly. I remember being with him at one time, when he had a telephone call from either London or Bonn. He got on the phone, and talked at some length about all sorts of details of the Action Committee, not about its financing but about substantive issues -- including the prospects for British membership. When he got through, I said, "Jean, do you really think it is safe, on the telephone which must be tapped, to talk like that?" And he said, "Look, I'm sure they're listening, but if they learn something, so much the better, let them listen." I've always suspected, in fact I'm convinced, that DeGaulle must have had a dossier on Monnet about two yards high.

LT: Without a doubt.

JT: But it's interesting that they never dared to use it, because I'm sure that the charge would have been that he was so close to Americans, and Germans, and British, and all sorts of people, that he came close to being treacherous.

LT: Well, he was certainly, just before the outset of World War II accused by one of his countrymen almost directly of being a traitor, because he was pro-British.

JT: Yes.

LT: A parenthetical remark to this Ford Foundation and the Action Committee reference which he wanted to make clear is that never a cent of any of that money from Ford was used for any of the political actions of the Action Committee. That is, the meetings, or the publications, or the reports they put out. It was reserved for particular things that were on the edges, done in those days by François

Duchêne and so on and so forth. But I don't mean to make an issue of that.

JT: No, but that's I think an important point, Len, to be clear on. I don't know the details concerning the financial support.

LT: Yes, but --

JT: But Shep and Joe and yourself and Duchêne do know, but I never knew precisely, and I never asked how the financial help from the Ford Foundation was used. But I think that in any history of Monnet it ought to be made quite clear, I would be interested myself to know just uh --

LT: He was very punctilious about this.

JT: Yes.

LT: Well, where do you see his -- I don't know whether you can handle this in an anecdotal way -- examples of his effectiveness. So many people knew Monnet, so single out different things. I wonder whether you have any particular notions that are unique.

JT: Well, I don't think they're particularly unique, but I think that what Monnet had was just an extraordinary sense of where political power lay in the various countries, in the United States with Eisenhower and Dulles, and after them with Kennedy.

I remember when Kennedy was assassinated, after I came back from Washington, and saw him, because by that time I was stationed in Brussels, but I came down to Paris very often, and I had really some serious misgivings about Lyndon Johnson despite his first really quite glorious 90 or a hundred days, and I was voicing these in front of Monnet, and Monnet said, "I'm for him," he said, "I'm for him --

I'm for him because he's the only president of the United States we've got." Now this reflected the fact that Monnet was determined to keep on good relationship with the political power in the United States. And of course this was, I think, in my view of him, this was the essence of the work he did in terms of European unity, by the very concept of the Action Committee -- with the Conservative parties, the Socialist parties, and the trade unions.

LT: Were you in Paris or in Washington when Monnet made his first trip to Washington, I think it was February of '61 when he came over to acquaint himself with the Kennedy regime.

JT: Oh, I must have been in Paris at the OECD.

LT: But tell me whether you gave him any advice at that time.

JT: Well, he was just like a dry sponge in terms of picking up advice about people, you know, so everybody he saw, every American, myself, and everybody else, he would ask about the new Administration. His main guide to that Administration was George Ball.

LT: It was. I met him when he got off the train in Washington for that visit. We were going back to his hotel, and he said, "Who's the most important man in the White House?" -- as was his wont to talk in that way. I said, "Well, I'm really not sure, maybe it's Arthur Schlesinger." He looked at me in that peculiar way he has, and he said, "That's not right at all. It's a chap by the name of Sorenson.⁹" Well, that was it.

JT: Yes, not that he was always absolutely right on his selection of the source of power, but he had a great instinct for it. If I may make a comment on his attitude towards things, the last time I

saw him (jumps a lot of years) about a year before he died, Bob Schaetzel and I went in to see him. He still had his office in Paris, but he was about to close it.

He was not well (he was always something of a hypochondriac as you know) and he was very sad about things, and also he didn't like the way the European Community was moving, or the fact that it wasn't moving -- that it wasn't doing very much. Finally he said, "Well, you know, if nothing else, what we've done, we've prevented another Franco-Prussian war. We have made it almost impossible." And I said, "Well, my dear friend, you know, that's quite a contribution, if that's been accomplished," and I think that's right. He did contribute greatly to that.

LT: John McCloy echoes a bit of what you say, he said, "I've never seen a man who knew more directly and immediately where power lay and how to get at it." And he said, "Monnet once said to me, he said, 'Jack, you're not very bright, but you're very lucky, and I think I'll stay close to you because you're a lucky man.'"

JT: Yes, he had a fixation on that. I remember one time when Erhardt became Chancellor of Germany. He took a dim view of Erhardt, as did I. We were bemoaning the fact that Erhardt was Chancellor. I said, "You know, this whole monetary reform and the removal of controls, and the subsequent economic expansion of Germany, came about just because of the fortunate timing of Erhardt's moves -- in other words, he was a lucky man." And Monnet said, "Oh, don't tell me that, don't tell me that on top of everything else he's lucky." But he had a very strong feeling that some people are just lucky, and I think there's something to the theory.

LT: Oh, sure there is. Well, I wonder, have you ever gone away from Monnet as some people have, saying, "I've learned something rather unique from that man that I never have from anyone else." A way of looking at a problem, a way of summing up a situation? Could be almost anything.

JT: Well, I think there were several things about it. In the first place, Monnet (and you'll hear it from Max Isenbergh) could be ruthless in the way that he used people. He sometimes even abused people, for example Jacques van Helmont really had no place to go after he left Monnet.

LT: François Duchêne had a nervous breakdown working for him and Monnet didn't give a damn.

JT: Yes, and yet on the other hand you know it was curious, though, he was that way. I think Isenbergh, Max's complaint, exaggerates the way Monnet felt. An example of how Monnet used a person without destroying him, was Pierre Uri. Pierre is one of the most egotistical men I've ever known, and at the same time a very imaginative man. Monnet exploited him, I think, in the right sense of the word. When he had particular problems, he would call in Uri and get his views. Then he would send him away, you know. As a matter of fact he used to send him away to me, because he was in my office when I was at the Atlantic Institute.

He asked me, after I had been at the Atlantic Institute for about a year, "How are you getting along with Uri?" (Just at that time he [Uri] had written a letter to the London Times with the heading, Atlantic Institute. In it he used excessive language in

attacking somebody or other.) I said, "Well, he's all right if we can just get him to control his language." Monnet laughed and said, "Control his language? you can't get him to control his language." But I do think that Monnet did have that ability, in handling an egocentric type like Uri, to exploit the imagination of the man without getting entangled.

LT: Well he began, I suppose, by realizing Uri's particular genius -- which he had. A footnote to your comment is that after René Mayer inherited Pierre Uri in Luxembourg, he confided in me one day, "You know, Monnet told me that Uri is invaluable. But he takes up so much time. I have to spend so much time placating Uri." I think Uri is really one of the great contributors to Europe, but indeed he did need someone like Monnet to be able to handle him.

JT: I know nobody else that's handled him the way Monnet did. And of course Monnet also had an instinct for others. For example he had an instinct for Bob Triffen. Triffen is entirely different from Pierre Uri, of course. He recognized the imaginative mind of Triffen. And he used others, you know, in special areas, he used Isenbergh for a while, on nuclear things, which Max knew quite a bit about.

He used people like Eugene Rostow on anti-trust. On a lot of other things I'm sure that he wouldn't pay any attention at all to Rostow. So he had a great ability to use that aspect or that strength of a man or woman.

But you know he was concerned about people, in a way. I remember one time, we were in Paris, my daughter, who rode horseback

a great deal, fell off her horse and had a slight concussion. Monnet was as worried about that, to all external appearances, as if it were his own daughter. He was after me all the time, asking how is she; had I had this or that examination, done that. As you know he was just tremendously devoted to his younger daughter. So he was a mixture, with great warmth on occasion but then sometimes a callousness in terms of some people. Let me tell you another story, because it is an anecdote which may help in terms of Monnet and David Bruce. Perhaps I told you about one --

LT: I don't know.

JT: When I was in Paris, and my family was over here, I frequently went out to their place in the country on the weekend. One Sunday I was there, having luncheon with Sylvia Monnet, and their daughter, and Monnet, and myself, just the four of us. They had roast chicken.

Sylvia brought out a carafe of white wine. Monnet didn't drink very much, you know, very little, really. And he tasted the white wine, and he said, "What is this?" in an unhappy sort of manner.

Sylvia said, "Well, Jean, I was just down at the village a few days ago and they strongly recommended this white wine, and I thought I'd try it." Monnet said, "I don't like it."

Then Sylvia turned to me, and said, "About ten or fifteen years ago, David Bruce was here for luncheon. We had a muscadet. David said, 'This is a splendid white wine.' Now Monnet won't drink anything but that muscadet."

Monnet looked like a schoolboy caught with his hand in the cookie jar. He turned to me and he said, "Why not? David Bruce knows

more about French wines than I'll ever know. He said it was a good wine, why should we change?"

In a way this was typical of this, again, this oversimplified version, this, simplified in a heroic way, in terms of fundamental policy, but once he decided something was good or bad, that was it.

LT: I must say, there's really been little enough said about Sylvia's role in his life. She has been, I'm sure, had quite a strong influence in a way in the background. I remember I was trying to rewrite a speech he was giving in New York. He was getting some Freedom Fund award. Sylvia and Monnet and I were sitting in a hotel room, and I had him read it over and I would say, "Stop dropping your voice at the end of every sentence." And Sylvia was saying, "Jean, I've been saying the same thing for years, at last somebody else is telling you that."

JT: I'd be curious, I'd like to see too your transcripts about the financing of the Ford Foundation, and what he used it for and what he didn't use it for.

LT: I will be talking both to Shep and to Slater about that and I'll certainly get into that. I remember that quite distinctly.

JT: And there is that other curious thing we mentioned, that he didn't take care of the people who worked for him. It's really strange, I don't understand it.

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Footnotes

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¹The interviewer recalls that Monnet arrived with Pierre-Paul Schweitzer in the fall of 1957 in Washington en mission from Maurice Bourges-Maunoury. However, the French Embassy office in New York reported its records showed that they visited Washington in January 1958, during the Premiership of Felix Gaillard. In any case, Guy Mollet had left the political scene by May of 1957.

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²Douglas Dillon.

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³Bernard Clappier at that time was Director of Exterior Economic Relations in the Ministry of Economic Affairs.

⁴James W. Riddleberger was director of the International Cooperation Administration from March 1959 through February 1961.

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⁵W. Randolph Burgess was U.S. Ambassador to NATO from 1957 to 1961.

⁶George Ball was Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs.

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⁷Lyndon Baines Johnson. Senator James William Fulbright was the Democratic Senator from Arkansas.

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⁸Philip Graham was publisher of the Washington Post newspaper.

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⁹Theodore C. Sorenson was special counsel to the President from 1961 to 1964.

TUTHILL, JOHN WILLS, educator; born Montclair, New Jersey, November 10, 1910; son Oliver Bailey and Louise Jerolomen (Wills) B.; Bachelor of Science, College of William & Mary, 1932; Master of Business Administration, New York University, 1936; Master of Arts, Harvard, 1943; Doctor of Laws, MacMurray College, 1967; married Erna Lueders, July 3, 1937; children -- Carol Anne, David. Teller, First National Bank, Paterson, New Jersey, 1932-34; corporate trust administrator, Bankers Trust Company, New York, 1934-36; investment counsel Fiduciary Counsel, New York City, 1936-37; instructor Northeastern, 1937-39, assistant professor banking and finance, 1939-40 appointed foreign service officer Department of State, 1940, served as vice consul, Windsor, Canada, 1940-41, Mazatlan, Mexico, 1942; third secretary embassy, Ottawa, 1942-44; secretary mission Office U.S. Political Adviser Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, 1944-45, and American Military Government for Germany, 1945-47, American consul, 1947; assistant chief shipping division Department of State, 1948, adviser, 1949; counselor of embassy, Stockholm, Sweden, 1949-51; special assistant ambassador London, 1952; deputy director Office of Economic Affairs, Bonn, Germany, 1952-54, USOM, Bonn, 1954, director, 1954-56, counselor of embassy for economic affairs, 1955-56; counselor of embassy for economic affairs with personal rank of minister, Paris, France, 1956-59; director Office European Regional Affairs, Department of State, 1959; minister-counselor economic affairs U.S. Mission to NATO, European Regional Organizations, U.S. representative preparatory committee for Organization of European Cooperation and Development, also deputy U.S. representative Organization of European Economic Cooperation, 1960; U.S. representative OECD with personal rank of ambassador, 1960-62; U.S. ambassador to European Communities, 1962-66, Brazil, 1966-69; professor International politics Johns Hopkins Bologna Center, Italy, 1969-76; president Salzburg Seminars in American Studies, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1977 --; director-general, government Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, Paris, France, 1969-76; director Atlantic Council U.S. Member British-North American Committee; member advisory board Georgetown Center for International and Strategic Studies, International Management & Development Institute, Member New York Council on Foreign Relations, Omicron Delta Kappa, Theta Delta Chi. Clubs: Century Assn. (New York City); Flat Hat of William & Mary. Office: 17 Dunster St. Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138.

